DVAITA VEDĀNTA

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

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The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy
UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

A Golden Jubilee Publication

GENERAL EDITOR

Dr V. A. DEVASENAPATHI

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BY

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

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FOREWORD

The Department of Philosophy was started in the University of Madras in September 1927. In August 1964 it was raised to the status of a Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy by the University Grants Commission. From 1976 it has come to be known as the Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy.

Since its inception in 1927, this Department has kept in view two major objectives: (1) the study of Indian systems of thought and (2) the study of other systems of thought. Last year the Department arranged for a course of special lectures in furtherance of these objectives.

Professor S. S. Raghavachar accepted the invitation of the Institute to deliver two courses of lectures, one on Dvaita Vedānta and the other on Viśiṣṭādvaita. He has very kindly given his consent to the publication of these lectures in the Golden Jubilee Series. His lectures on Dvaita appear in the present volume. The Institute is grateful to Professor Raghavachar not only for these Lectures but also for his kind co-operation with the Institute in its various activities.

The Institute wishes to thank the Government of Tamil Nadu, Dr Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, the Vice-Chancellor and the other authorities of the University of Madras for the financial aid given for these publications. The Institute is appreciative of the interest evinced by the University Grants Commission in upgrading the parent Department into a Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, financing it for ten years and for its subsequent and sustained interest in the progress of the Institute.

The Institute is grateful to the late Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri for laying the foundations of the Department on sound lines and to Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan, former Director of the Institute for building up the Department over a period of three and a half decades by his devoted services.

The General Editor wishes to thank his colleagues, Professor R. Balasubramanian, Dr P. K. Sundaram, and Dr T. S. Devadoss for going through the proofs, and the Rathnam Press for the prompt and neat execution of the work.

Madras, 20-3-1977.

V. A. DEVASENAPATHI
Director

PREFACE

I am glad that the Special Lectures on Dvaita are being published so expeditiously. I have great admiration for this Scheme of Special Lectures organized by the Dr S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, and feel honoured by its assignment to me. In these lectures, I have endeavoured to focus on the fundamentals of the Dvaita system and have based myself on the basic texts. Many of the texts were made available to me by my friends, particularly Sri K. Raghupathi Rao. I am deeply grateful for this help. I am also indebted profoundly to my esteemed friend, Sri Koulagi Seshachar, who went through the matter with conscientious thoroughness, characteristic of him, and have greatly benefited from his criticism and suggestions. It is a pleasure for me to acknowledge my sense of grateful obligation to Dr V. A. Devasenapathi, the learned Director of the Institute, for his courtesy, encouragement and spirit of philosophical fraternity.

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR

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I. ORIENTATION

I am happy that the Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy has launched this scheme of special lectures on the different systems of Indian Philosophy and also on special philosophical themes that have gone into the shaping of the philosophical tradition of our country in general and also that of South India in particular. I am honoured by the assignments to me in this scheme and would like to put on record my deep sense of gratitude to the authorities of the University and the Director of the Institute, in particular. The responsibility is heavy and the quality of performance must depend to a large extent on how far I submit to the inspiration of my theme. In all humility and devout enthusiasm I address myself to my task hoping that the very generous expectations may engender the requisite resources for adequacy in me.

In this series of lectures I am to devote myself to the Dvaita system of Vedānta promulgated in all its energy and fulness of form by the great Ācārya, Śrī Madhva or Ānanda Tīrtha.

Before attempting an exposition of the school in some detail in all its significant aspects, I take it that a general indication of the fundamental orientation of the system may be of value.

(a) One of the important designations of the system is '*tattva-vāda*' and the term is adopted by Madhva himself in his *māyā-vāda-khaṇḍana*. The term needs a little explanation to be understood in the right manner. It stands as an antithesis to *māyā-vāda* and the latter propounds the view that the world we encounter in our empirical consciousness is a phenomenal or even illusory construction lacking substantiality of being. In opposition to this, the Dvaita philosophy argues for the reality of the world. In other words, what is normally described as the external world, the world of objects and situations, that the human mind faces in its experience, is real and objective according to *tattva-vāda*. This tendency in philosophical thought is characterised as realism

in recent European terminology. The point, therefore, is that Dvaita champions the realistic standpoint in philosophy. The historical significance of the position is immense. In Indian philosophy, two systems of thought, the Mahāyāna Buddhism in its Mādhyamika and Yogācāra phases and Advaita Vedānta, refute realism on solid metaphysical and epistemological grounds. Madhva's philosophy is opposed to this antirealist stand in all possible thoroughness. Some general considerations utilized in this connection may be indicated. Madhva holds that realism taking the waking world as real has the backing of common-sense and hence its proofs for the reality of the world may not seek any special strength in that direction. But a philosophy that repudiates the world is in need of the most rigorous argument in its support. Unfortunately, such support is not to be found in the Idealistic schools in question.[1] Realism is the natural bent of the human mind and it has been appropriated by all schools that speak of the intrinsic validity of human understanding in the notion of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya.* As such, its refutation must be invulnerable. Realism with regard to the external world has an empirical basis. Our perceptual consciousness and all the super-structure of thought built on that basis present the world as real. Mere dialectic, epistemological or otherwise, cannot demolish the world. A perceptual error can be eliminated or corrected only by a perception or perceptions of a wider range and deeper level and never by mere ratiocination. Madhva works out this position through a close analysis of some perceptual errors and their correction. The implication of this position is that empirical errors can be transcended only in a larger and profounder empiricism. Hence a total repudiation of empiricism and its realistic affirmations is impossible in essence.[2] One may recall a parallel pronouncement of Bosanquet that 'transcedence of immediacy is not transcendence of experience'.[3] G. E. Moore in his famous essay on 'The Defence

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1. *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya* (edited by Śrī Kaivara Venkata Rao, Ramakrishnappa Dvaita Vedanta *Pāṭa-śālā*, Bangalore, 1955), pp. 305 and 306. (Hereafter this book will be referred as *VTV*.
2. *VTV*, pp. 148, 307.
3. *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 2–3 and 146.

of Commonsense' rightly points out the self-contradiction involved in the rejection of common-sense about the world without admitting the world which alone can make commonsense a possibility. One cannot administer a kick to the earth without ably placing himself on the earth.

The actual refutation of the realistic view of the external world on the part of Advaita need not be gone into in detail at this stage. Dvaita does not concede any force to the arguments in the context. For instance, one of the standard arguments of Advaita, proving the unreality of the world on the ground of its 'cognisability' or *dṛśyatva* is exhibited by Madhva in his *pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa* as a capital illustration for all the fallacies of reasoning (*hetvābhāsa*). The mutability of empirical objects (*anityatva*) cannot be confounded with *bādhyatva* (*sublatability*). Variation is not cancellation. The dream world is a transcript of the waking world and it has its authentic roots in it. Instead of the latter being an extension of dream, the dream is an attenuated presentation of the other. Deep sleep does not present the external world not because it is non-existent but because the conditions for experiencing it are not there. This is not a case of *yogyānupalabdhi*, but merely *anupalabdhi*. We have to see in all this that a strong and stubborn realism is a dominant element in the philosophical temper of Dvaita.

(b) The next dominant constituent of Dvaita is its pluralism. It is this that is signified by the more common reference to the system as Dvaita. This term like the other one, *tattvāvāda*, requires a historical elucidation. Advaita asserting the total oneness of the individual self and the absolute Self is naturally described as Advaita or non-dualism. As this school rejects categorically that identification or non-dualism, its description derived from that antagonism has given rise to its name 'Dvaita'. This is not a dualism such as that of Jainism and Sāṅkhya or of even the initial position of Descartes. It stands just for the recognition of the distinction between the finite self and the supreme Being. The extension of this principle is the assertion of a similar distinction between the finite self and nature on the one hand and that

between nature and the supreme Being on the other. Similarly the selves are to be distinguished among themselves, and objects constitutive of nature are to be considered a plurality. This five-fold difference named *pañca-bheda* is a fundamental verity, and it is held to be the meaning of the term '*prapañca*' signifying the universe as a whole. Inalienable uniqueness is a basic characteristic of all that exists in the realm of nature and the realm of spirits. This is the pluralism of Madhva. No wonder it is opposed to all forms of monism. How far the pluralism gets integrated into a coherent philosophy, we will see in the sequel. In the mean while, its dialectical core has to be discerned. Advaita, in the hands of Maṇḍana Miśra, and all the other writers coming after him, has built up a powerful case against the very concept of 'difference' (*bheda*), and has thus endeavoured to knock the bottom out of all types of pluralism. Madhva, therefore, enters into this polemics and seeks to demonstrate the spurious nature of the refutation of difference. With that end accomplished, pluralism stands secure and established. Some idea of this argument and counter-argument is necessary for understanding the radical position of our system. Maṇḍana has a two-fold attack, epistemological and ontological. Epistemologically, as pluralism rests on empiricism, it has to be pointed out how difference gets apprehended in perceptual cognition. All difference is of some entity or substance that differs from others. This entity must be apprehended prior to the apprehension of its difference from all that it differs from. This is a simple enough matter. The positive fundament has to furnish the ground for subsequent differentiation from the connected correlatives. But the initial apprehension is alone perceptual and the subsequent acts of thought are just retrospective constructions or imaginations. Thus perception in its purest initial step grasps what is differenceless, and all the difference read into the initial datum is non-perceptual and hence a falsifying addition. This is the epistemological aspect of the dialectic. In the ontological sphere, we have to decide whether difference is the substantive essence, *dharmi-svarūpa*, of the entity or its *dharma*, property or quality. It cannot be the first, for the essence is non-relational and has, in fact, to supply the base for subsequent

relational thought, while the difference is fundamentally a relational characteristic. It functions between entities; and independent of correlatives it has no meaning whatever. So *dharmi-svarūpa* is not *bheda*. Can it be a *dharma*? This is an equally impossible alternative, for it requires the admission of a difference between the substantive and its properties, and thus leads to an infinite regress. For difference to be a property only, there must be a *difference* between the substance and this property of *difference*. The whole dialectic has to be repeated with regard to the newly admitted difference. There is no end to this process of positing differences to support differences. This is roughly the Advaitic polemics as initiated by Maṇḍana Miśra.[4] Madhva faces the situation in a frontal manner.[5] He holds in the epistemological sphere, that the initial perceptual apprehension is of the unique essence of the object concerned, not undifferentiated but differentiated in a synoptic way from all else. The so-called later differentiation is just an explication and confirmation of this primary differentiation, in relation to specific correlatives needing such classification. The entire realm of correlatives is noted as a totality in the primary cognition even as millions of lights may be noticed as a single light from a distance. The fundament is a unique factor containing within itself all the potentiality for subsequent discriminations. This self-distinguishing uniqueness stands in the case of the majority of correlatives and calls for confirmation only in the case of correlatives with affinity of character to the fundament, thereby provisionally suspending the initial discrimination.

This suspension is removed by the explicit differentiation confirming thereby the primary uniqueness. So perception is not apprehension of *being as such* with differentiation to be superadded subsequently but of unique entities whose uniqueness is explicated in the course of later experience. Only this explanation can account for the limited range of confusions and misidentifications and their elimination through discriminations. The epistemological issue is solved in substance hereby. There is no relation

4. See for an interesting approximation to this argument in B. Russell's *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 58–60.
5. *VTV*, pp. 134–146.

of 'before' and 'after', between cognizing an entity and cognizing its uniqueness. There is only a single cognizing in the situation. This contains the answer to the metaphysical argument also. *Bheda* is the very *svarūpa* of things, and the positive essence and negative demarcation are indissolubly one, even as Brahman and its identity are. The *bheda* in question is apprehended in advance of detailed differentiation, and as such does not stand in need of reference to individual correlatives in detail. The positive fundament and the negative differentiating aspect may be distinguished in discourse, but are an unbroken unity in reality. The positive does not precede the relational differentiation, but the synoptic grasp of uniqueness precedes the elaborate articulation of uniqueness. The *bheda* may be taken as a property or *dharma* also, and the distinction between *dharmi* and *dharma* has no metaphysical finality so as to involve an infinite regress. Madhva concludes that the entire polemics against the principle of *bheda* is a futile exercise of subtlety. Even as the basic dialectic of Maṇḍana is elaborated into huge proportions and ramifications by Advaitins such as Vimuktātman, Prakaśātman, Ānandabodha, Śrīharṣa and Citsukha, the counter-argument of Madhva is developed enormously by Jaya Tīrtha, Vyāsa Tīrtha and others. The upshot of the whole vindication of 'difference' as a metaphysical principle is that pluralism stands upheld as a sound philosophical standpoint in Dvaita-vedānta.

(c) The realistic and pluralistic temper of Dvaita finds its consummation in theism. In philosophical motivation it is theism that is the central doctrine of Dvaita, and Madhva argues that if the external world is a framework of illusion and the distinction between the supreme Spirit and the finite selves is unreal, the affirmation of God stands jeopardized. He would then be the bearer of the illusions, as He is the ultimate percipient without a second and His identity with the finite self would cancel all claims to supremacy and infinitude of perfections. The realism and pluralism are subordinate supplements to the unqualified assertion of God. His splendour is the ultimate metaphysical concern and that requires the reality of the cosmos and the fact of God transcending the finite self.

Madhva is unambiguous in his enunciation of the basic proposition of his thought.[6] How can the world into which God has poured His grace be a hallucination?[7] How can the individual Spirit with all its infirmities of finitehood be constitutive of His absolute essence? Such are the considerations of Madhva in his dialectical defence of realism and pluralism. He is a radical realist and a radical pluralist, because he is a redical theist.

Madhva builds up his theism through a systematic refutation of anti-theistic schools of Indian philosophy. This purport is the major subject-matter of his commentaries on the second quarter of the Second Chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra*. All the schools except the Śaiva and the Śākta systems propound their views in terms of reason and all of them with the exception of Yoga and Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika are atheistic. Madhva conducts a critical review of Cārvaka, Sāṅkhya, the Buddhistic schools, and Jainism and demonstrates the unsatisfactory character of their anti-theistic speculations. The Cārvaka hardly qualifies itself to the rank of a philosophical system. The Sāṅkhya dualism propounds a muddled cosmology with its mechanics of *prakṛti* and non-intervening plurality of *puruṣas*. The Yoga is thinly theistic and does not concede to its Īśvara centrality of metaphysical significance. The Vaiśeṣika coupled with Nyāya does not handle properly its cosmological issues in spite of its sophisticated atomism. Its theory of causation is full of difficulties. Buddhism of the Sarvāstivāda schools of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika is bedevilled by its doctrine of *kṣaṇika-vāda*, momentariness. The Yogācāra school stands condemned by its unsustainable subjectivism. The Mādhyamika Śūnya admits no positive fundamentals either in epistemology or metaphysics and naturally can establish nothing. The Śākta system elevates the derivative category of Śākti to metaphysical eminence and breaks down in consequence. The theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and Pāśupata err by way of insufficient theism and base themselves on weak speculative proofs for the existence of God. The method adopted is wrong and no wonder the resulting conception of God is poor.

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6. *Anuvyākhyāna*, 3-3—Verses 78 and 79.
7. *Yadanugrahataḥ santi*.

The moral of the situation is both obvious and irresistable—that anti-theistic philosophical thinking can produce no satisfactory account of reality according to the Madhva examination of the schools. It is not that the limitation is due to the individual exponents of them, but proceeds from the basic flaw of approach. The theological weakness of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Pāśupata and the Śākta systems will get clarified in the sequel. So theism in all completeness is the third outstanding element in the formation of Dvaita.

(d) A further characterization of this theism has to be made, and that brings out another dominant trait of Dvaita. This is a theism based on scriptural revelation. Madhva declares that the God he adores is to be known only through sound scriptural authority, *sadāgama.*[8] A host of problems arise at once. (1) Why admit the scriptures? (2) What are the sound scriptures? We have no reason to discard the probative value of revelation. Sense-perception and reasoning based upon it are not the only sources of knowledge. If revelation furnishes a body of information not obtainable through the other means of knowledge, if it is free from internal discrepancy and is also not impeachable from other sources of authentic knowledge, it cannot be validly discarded. To give up insight to reality if it is both *aprāpta* and *abādhita* is to surrender all claims to rationality. If attempts to work out a satisfactory view of existence independently of it are untenable, it is a further re-inforcement of the insight in question. These are the familiar Vedāntic thoughts on the question. Reason itself, it seems, compels the admission of revelation. The position is far different from unreasoned and blind adoption of dogma.

This position is further supported by the principle of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda,* according to which human understanding enjoys an intrinsic reliability unless impeded by contradiction, which is a proof that the understanding in question is not functioning according to the law of its nature, but is being vitiated by external factors. This is a principle adopted and supported by all schools of Mīmāṁsā and all schools of Vedānta. The possibility of such

8, Invocatory verse of *VTV.*

vitiating alien influence is always there in human testimony. Hence the advocates of Vedic tradition resort to the supplementary hypothesis that the Vedic testimony is authorless and eternal. This entire position is accepted by Dvaita. The Nyāya thinkers make the *Veda* an emanation from God and such a position is open only to those who believe in the possibility of proving God's existence independent of Vedic testimony. Otherwise, if God's existence is to be established through revelation itself, the argument would be circular. Dvaita denies such a possibility and regards the Nyāya demonstration of God's existence through reason as fallacious.[9] Hence the alternative of holding the *Veda* as authorless and unoriginated is the only remaining position. Dvaita accepts it wholeheartedly and renders the operation of the principle of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* absolutely free from liability to alien falsification. In all this heavy dogmatics, Dvaita strikes no special note; and if it does not appeal to the modern mind, it errs in good company. The basic position about *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* is epistemologically weighty. The oddity of the defence of Vedic revelation practically disappears when the grandeur of the content of the revelation is realized. It begins to seem worthwhile ingenuity.

The second question posed above as to what are the sound scriptures receives a definite and oft-repeated answer from Madhva. He says that sound scriptures are "the Vedas beginning with the *Ṛg-veda*, the *Mahābhārata*, the whole of *Pāñcarātra Āgama*, the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Purāṇas* in accord with these, and all other sacred works in conformity to them."[10] Of these only the *Vedas* are given the tribute of impersonality and eternality and the rest are personal compositions of divine personalities in augmentation of their teachings. The concordance with the import of these primeval texts is held up as the criterion for the evaluation of all works with religious claims. There does not seem to be any bounds for this latter class of revelation-texts, and they may well include devotional compositions of all ages and peoples. Śrī Veda-Vyāsa is said to have restored the original scriptural

9. *VTV*, pp. 83–85.
10. *VTV*, page 5.

material and given it a methodical arrangement in addition to propagating it through his priceless *Mahābhārata* and the great Purāṇas. The Pāñcarātra Āgamas are accepted partially by Śrī Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, and Madhva holds that they are venerable authorities in their entirety. The *Rāmāyaṇa* mentioned in the list is the original *Rāmāyaṇa*, from which all the multifarious compositions of that description are said to be subsequent derivatives. Jaya Tīrtha, it may be noted,[11] instances *Manu-dharma-śāstra* among the later conforming texts.

This body of revelation-literature is set forth as furnishing the system of sound theism, which is the ultimate philosophy. A question arises at this stage. It is well-known that considerable Vedic literature concerns itself with sacrificial and ritualistic rites and the duties of man. In fact, the authority of the impersonal *Vedas* is invoked precisely for determining the moral imperatives, which transcend the scope of other means of knowledge such as *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. In all this, the ethical and not the metaphysical significance of the *Vedas* is emphasized. This direction of utilizing the *Vedas* was standardized and finalised by all the schools of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā which sharply negated the relevance and validity of the *Vedas* for determining the nature of reality, and affirmed that their primary function was to promulgate *dharma* or what they technically named *kārya*, practical obligation claiming fulfilment. This action-oriented interpretation seemed to preclude the metaphysical use of the Vedic revelation. This attitude is an antithesis to all the schools of Vedānta, and all of them strenuously repudiate it. Madhva too joins the controversy and builds up a strong case for the metaphysical primacy of the Vedic revelation.

The Mīmāṁsā version of the philosophy is so conclusively eliminated that the debate now possesses only a historical interest.[12]

(e) The further characterization of the theism embodied in the Vedic revelation is also characteristic. This theism is described as Vaiṣṇavism, identifying the supreme Reality propounded in the

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11. Comment. *VTV*, page 6.
12. *VTV*, pp. 70–78.

Vedas as Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa. This identification is also one of the fundamental elements in Madhva's spiritual outlook. It is to be remarked at once that Madhva does not read into the Vedic thought what he derives from an alien cult, or sectarian religious tradition. He contends that he is only bringing into clarity what is the original and authentic core of Vedic theism. It is true that the *Vedas* contain adoration of many deities but, according to Madhva, they leave us in no doubt as to which deity is the God of gods, the supreme divine Reality, according to them. Superficial understanding may see the point somewhat obscurely. But a full and penetrating study of the entire substance of the Scripture will discern the luminous dominance of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is praised enough in a straightforward manner. Madhva quotes, among others, a very significant passage from the *Ṛg-veda* wherein it is clearly enunciated that the other Gods derive their limited prowess from the worship of Viṣṇu.[13] It is interesting to note that Sāyaṇa explains the passage in almost the same spirit. The other Vaiṣṇava writers such as Sudarśana Sūri and Vedānta Deśika adduce it in support of their Vaiṣṇavism. Among the *Upaniṣads*, the fourth chapter of the *Taittirīya* abounds in the glorification of Nārāyaṇa, as the supreme God, in the section called *Nārāyaṇānuvāka*. Madhva quotes from *Harivaṁśa* verse that enunciates the pervasive Vaiṣṇavism of the Vedic literature:

> " *Vede rāmāyaṇe caiva purāṇe bhārate tathā*
> *Ādau ante ca madhye ca viṣṇuḥ sarvatra gīyate* "
> (*Sūtra-bhāṣya*, I Adhikaraṇa)

Madhva cites certain texts in support of this position. The Vedic literature speaks nowhere of the non-existence of Viṣṇu before creation as it does in reference to other gods. Nowhere are any difficiencies ascribed to Him as is done with regard to other gods. The names of all gods are applied to Viṣṇu Himself indicative of His omnipresence in and through all gods.

13. *VTV*, page 345, *Ṛg-veda*, 7-40-5.

The position[14] maintained is that an objective and full scrutiny of the Vedic literature reveals the supremacy of Viṣṇu among the Vedic gods and not to accept it would be contrary to the evidence. There is a textual compulsiveness about the conclusion. The terms Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva and Nārāyaṇa are not mere sectarian labels of God-head, but carry profound philosophical connotations such that what the Upaniṣadic term, Brahman, intends to bring out, is fully incorporated in these Vaiṣṇavite designations of God-head. Systematic elucidation of the Vedic philosophy was carried out by three branches of Mīmāṁsā, the *Karma-mīmāṁsā*, *Daivī-mīmāṁsā* and the *Brahma-mīmāṁsā* dealing respectively with the conduct and rituals advocated, the Gods adored and the philosophical inquiry into Brahman. Of these the second branch concludes with the proposition that Viṣṇu is the supreme God and it is of Him that the *Brahma-sūtra* conducts investigation under the designation of Brahman. This second *mīmāṁsā* is no concoction of the Dvaita tradition and it is referred to by both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.[15]

Vedānta Deśika[16] actually quotes the aphorisms from *Daivī-mīmāṁsā* on which Madhva relies for his Vaiṣṇavism. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Prasthāna-bheda*, purporting to give a synoptic view of the Vedic learning, accords to it due recognition.

On this Vaiṣṇavism as such, two general remarks may be made. (1) The problem here is not philosophical in character, but only exegetical. This limitation of the frame of reference is fully recognized by Madhva and his followers. (2) But as the philosophical point of view advanced founds itself on the *Vedas*, the exegetical issue is vital for purposes of a clear identification of the Vedic theism.

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14. *Śrutapakāśikā*, 1–4–last section; Vedānta Deśika, *Gītārtha-saṅgraha-rakṣa*.
15. *VTV*, page 350.
16. *Anuvyākhyāna* under the first Sūtra; see also Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on *Brahma-sūtra*, III, iii, 43.
17. *Śatadūṣaṇī*, III chap.

It may also be observed in passing that Śaṅkara himself has strong Vaiṣṇava leanings as could be discerned in his commentaries in general and his surprising identification of the Nirguṇa–Brahman itself with Nārāyaṇa in his interpretation of the fifteenth chapter of the *Gītā*.

Madhva has in his philosophy this Vaiṣṇavism of a strong type as one of its principal ingredients.

We have now a complete picture before us of the orientation of Dvaita. It is realism and pluralism supplementing a grand theism; and the theism is founded on the Vedic revelation, which revelation is elucidated to be through and through Vaiṣṇava in character.

II. LITERARY HERITAGE

It is necessary to have a brief idea of the philosophical writing produced by the Dvaita tradition. Two points of significance may be noted at once. Unlike Śaṅkara, who had some unnamed predecessors and his preceptor's preceptor Gauḍapāda whose striking work is available, and Rāmānuja who definitely built upon the foundations of Viśiṣṭādvaita laid by Nāthamuni and Yāmunācārya, Madhva had no predecessor. His only predecessor seems to have been Veda-Vyāsa. No earthly Ācārya paved the way for him. With no John the Baptist, he had to accomplish his literary mission as an innovator. Secondly, this fact notwithstanding, the tradition, starting latest in the history of Vadānta, has produced an enormous body of exegetical and philosophical literature. The inspiration released by Madhva was so powerful and the talents that providence harnessed to the school were so many and so soaring.

Madhva was given to brevity and decisiveness of utterance. He has left us thirty-seven works. Some are devotional and aid conduct, ritualistic and ethical. One big work is devoted to the philosophical and literary elucidation of *Mahābhārata*. This is his famous *Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya*.

A very much shorter gloss on the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* is also there. Some select and important hymns of the *Ṛg-veda* are commented upon in a special work written for that purpose. The ten principal *Upaniṣads* have elicited adequate commentaries. Of these the one on *Aitareya* is elaborate and contains very significant theological material. The *Gitā*, which Madhva calls the '*madhu*' drawn from the '*pārijāta*' of the *Mahābhārata*, has two commentaries, *Gitā-bhāṣya* and *Gitā-tātparya* corroborating and supplementing each other. The *Brahma-sūtra* is looked upon as constituting the body of *para-vidyā*, the highest knowledge. Madhva's devotion to this supreme classic of Vedānta is of the highest order. His *bhāṣya* on it is brief and confines itself to the positive elucidation of the aphorisms. He defends his inter-

pretation of each section thereof by the aptest quotations from ancient scriptural texts. The work, as such, does not contain much dialectic. This negative and critical part of the interpretation is accomplished in the famous *Anuvyākhyāna*, perhaps the most polemical of Madhva's works. The canons of the interpretation are set down in *Nyāya-vivaraṇa*, which is also of the nature of a brief gloss on the *sūtras*. A very short and quintessential enunciation of the substance of the *Brahma-sūtra* is given ie *Anu-bhāṣya.*

There are ten shorter manuals called *Prakaraṇas.* Some of them tackle some controversial issues connected with Advaita. Some enumerate the fundamental categories of the system. Two deal with epistemological and dialectical methodology. The longest of them is *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya*, which is, by far, the finest statement of the philosophy of Madhva, in both its constructive and destructive aspects, following a method of presentation not impeded like a commentary by the demands of an original.

The next great writer of the tradition, after some immediate disciples of Madhva, is Jaya Tīrtha. His literary contribution to the system is immense. He commented upon three of Madhva's works on the *Brahma-sūtra* of which *Sudhā* on *Anuvyākhyāna* is a work of surpassing brilliance. His work on *Sūtra-bhāṣya* elucidates it appropriately. He has written glosses on some of the Ācārya's *bhāṣyas* on the *Upaniṣads.* He has commented upon both the works of Madhva on the *Gītā*. Some of the *prakaraṇas* have his illuminating comments. His explanation of *Viṣṇu-tattva—nirṇaya* is a match to the great original. In elegance of style, mastery in dialectics, philosophical learning and acumen and profound comprehension of Madhva's thoughts, he is superb and unrivalled. It is fitting that he is venerated as 'the Commentator,' *ṭikācārya.*

The next master in the tradition is Vyāsa Tīrtha or Vyāsa-rāya. Three of his works have attained the greatest eminence. His *Nyāyāmṛta* is a comprehensive attack on Advaita, taking note of every single great writing of the system and covering all its aspects. His *Tarka-tāṇḍava* is a contribution to logic and epistemo-

logy and stands on a level with Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*. His *Candrikā* is an amplification of Jaya Tīrtha's *Tattva-prakāśikā* and it achieves a commanding view of the *Brahma-sūtra* and evaluates all the other commentaries of it from that standpoint.

It is difficult to exhaust the enumeration of all the great writers. We may mention, Vijaya Dhvaja, Vijayīndra, Vādi Rāja, Raghūttama and Rāghavendra Tīrtha among the celebrities.

We may say in a nutshell that Madhva laid down the fundamentals of the philosophy, Jaya Tīrtha raised the grand edifice, and Vyāsa Tīrtha imparted to it dialectical finality. The literature is massive and is marked by height of vision and articulation of details.

III. EPISTEMOLOGY

The epistemology of Dvaita is a difficult field for two reasons. Its continuous philosophical combat with Advaita called up special powers in that direction and the later writers of the school had mastered the best in the Nyāya tradition of logic both old and new, even superseding it sometimes. What can be attempted in the space at our disposal can only be a summary of major conceptions.

(a) The initial analysis of the knowledge situation must be properly attended to. Knowledge is something that takes place between a subject that knows and an object that is known. This subject-object implication of knowledge is fundamental. No knowing is possible without a self that knows and there can be no knowing which is not a knowing of something. There is no difficulty in conceiving of the relation between the knower and knowing. They are two aspects of the same spiritual entity, distinguishable but not really two in reality. And again, knowing and its object have a unique relation and attempts to identify or define the relation in terms of *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* in Nyāya—Vaiśeṣika are doomed to fail. This all-important relation must be understood in terms of its own nature. *Viṣaya-viṣayibhāva* is a fundamental fact of the situation.

(b) Knowledge, we know, is something that a knower seeks in order to gain a true apprehension of reality. Truth-seeking is the basic impetus behind the cognitive process. Now, the schools of Vedic exegesis, the Mīmāṁsakas, and the Vedāntins of all schools, maintain that the knowing power in the self reaches its goal of apprehending reality by a natural law of its own nature, and no special external prop or aid is necessary for this purpose.[1]

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1. See Bosanquet's *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, page 82: "If you can get the mind pure......you must possess in it a true characterization of reality. ......Its doing so is not exceptional; it is inherent; it is what we mean by thinking."

This is what is called the theory of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya.* This intrinsic truth-finding power of understanding has two aspects. They relate to the genesis of the truth in knowledge and the cognition of the truth in question. These theorists contend that both these, truthfulness of knowledge and the ascertainment of that truthfulness, are intrinsic to the knowing process. Errors and deviations arise in the unnatural and adventitiously caused circumstance of our understanding being thwarted and perverted by external factors. That such misdirection has occurred can be found when the content of knowledge is inconsistent within itself and contradicts other well-established elements of truth. Incoherence and contradiction are the criterion of error. They point out that the knowing process has been contaminated by falsifying adjuncts. In other words, untruth is externally caused and is ascertained through the external circumstance of contradiction. The contradiction may be simple intellectual incoherence or pragmatic failure. So truth is intrinsic to knowing in every sense, and error is extrinsic to it. This position is wholly accepted by Dvaita, with considerable additional substantiation. It fits into the realistic temper of the school excellently.

(c) The problem of error arises at once. What is the ontological status of what is apprehended in error? Indian epistemology through the various systems is bedevilled by this problem. A perceptual error or illusion is a crucial illustration of the problem. Total nihilists are naturally free with the explanation that error is perception of the non-existent, as for them, all knowing in general is the knowing of the 'void' in reality. The subjectivist will just qualify the position and say that it is just the projection of ideas into an imaginary external realm. So is all knowledge for him. These are extreme theorists, and they are happy over the phenomenon of illusion for, it is on its analogy that they seek to discredit the reality of the external world. Not so the realists in Indian philosophy. Both the Prābhākaras and Viśiṣṭādvaitins attempt to explain illusion away as simple insufficiently determinate apprehension. There are difficulties in this solution. The Nyāya—Vaiśeṣika and Bhāṭṭa solution is that error is a case of mis—apprehension, transfer of what is real in some other context to the immediate context. Only the mislocation is the wrong

factor. The entity transported is real in its place and time. But the trouble in the explanation is that some measure of the apprehension of the non-existent must be granted, for surely the identity of the presented object and the object super-posed on it are non-existent. The realism of the account breaks down somewhat. There are some other difficulties also. In Advaita Vedānta a unique explanation is offered. Error lies in an illegitimate elevation of the rank of reality of the apprehended object. The illusory object is not non-existent. It enjoys a lower order of being. It has a presentational or empirical status. But it is transferred to a higher level in illusion and invested with identity with what enjoys a higher status in the order of being. In reality, error is the apprehension of what is neither real nor unreal. It occupies a mid-region of the indescribable. It is at this juncture that Dvaita enters the arena. It is not necessary to go over the full discussion of all the several theories,—a famous discussion,—by Jaya Tīrtha in his *Sudhā*. Madhva's solution in its essentials is what is of interest in the context.[2] Madhva argues that the Advaitic explanation cannot do away with an element of the apprehension of the non-existent. The identity of the existent of the lower order of being with an existent of the higher order, to which it stands elevated in error, is surely non-existent. If that identity is also allocated to the realm of the indescribable, there are two identities in the situation, the higher order identity and the lower order identity, which is confounded with it. Thus a whole series of confusions is engendered resulting in an inescapable infinite regress. Hence the Advaitic account does not contain even a promise of a solution. The fact is that there should be a frank admission, in a valid theory of error, of an element of the apprehension of the non-existent. *Error is, therefore, to be defined as the apprehension of the existent as non-existent and of the non-existent as existent.* Non-existence is a conceivable category as the Advaitin himself regards the indescribable content of error as *other than* the non-existent. Surely that distinction requires the cognizability of the non-existent for purposes of contrast. Hence Madhva's theory of error is labelled as '*Abhinavānyathākhyāti*—

2. *VTV*, pp. 150 to 158.

vāda'. The realist's dread of the non-existent being an object of apprehension seems to have driven him to the desperate expedient of allocating the object of illusion somehow to the realm of reality, as it has done with *akhyāti-vāda*, *satkhyāti-vāda* and *anyathākhyāti-vāda*. What is really required is to take care of the objectivity of true cognition and leave error to traffic in unrealities and get crushed thereby, as it is its due. Otherwise, the sublation of error becomes a mockery. The nihilistic and subjectivistic theories should be annihilated in their account of truth and for their making truth a species of error. They seem to be speaking the truth in their description of error.

(d) In the progress of understanding towards veridical cognition of reality there are two stages. There is the ultimate stage in which the intellectual quest for the real reaches fulfilment. In the other schools, this attainment of the objective of truth—seeking is named '*pramā*'. The process leading to this end-product assisted by all the factors whose instrumentality is involved in it is called '*pramāṇa*' the means of valid knowledge. In Dvaita both are called '*pramāṇa*' with the distinction that the instrumental procedure is called '*anupramāṇa*', 'subsidiary *pramāṇa*', while its consummation is called '*kevala-pramāṇa*', the 'pure' *pramāṇa*. The distinction as well as the coinage of the two terms implying the continuity of the cognitive process seems perfectly justified. Prof. Hiriyanna admits as much in his remark that Madhva 'makes a distinction, which appears to be too obvious to need affirmation.'[3] While the distinction is conceded in the remark, the point of importance that the two are a single continuous process needing the same name, with just different prefixes is also to be recognized. The means and end in knowledge, as in morality, are not two separable items, and the end is the completion of the means.

(e) By *anupramāṇa*, we have to understand the ways or modes of knowledge. It is necessary to classify these modes and note the special features of each of them.

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3. *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, page 197.

A *pramāṇa*—we shall refer to *anupramāṇa* as simply *pramāṇa* in this context—is a means of valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is that which grasps its object authentically as it is in itself. The nature of truth is defined as the fidelity of cognitive consciousness to reality. This fidelity is generated and made known by the very factors that generate knowledge and bring about our awareness of it. This is the principle of *svataḥprāmāṇya.* The failure to achieve this fidelity is caused by external vitiating factors and is made known by the contradiction of the knowledge in question with the rest of established factual information and by the pragmatic failure of calculations based on the assumption of its validity. Hence truth is agreement with reality; the tests of truth are the several forms of coherence. The vexing problem in recent Western thought about the meaning and criterion of truth, whether they are the same and what precisely is the test of truth, is smoothly got over in Indian philosophy in general and the particular clarification in Dvaita. The intuitive theory of truth is incorporated in the *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* conception.

Dvaita is emphatic that there are three and only three modes of knowing. Unlike Cārvāka, which admits only *pratyakṣa*, and unlike Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism which admit only *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, and also unlike Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita which admit more such as *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi*, but like Sāṅkhya and Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita recognizes only *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*. It further asserts that they are mutually irreducible, having distinct spheres of operation. The extra sources of knowledge posited by some other schools can legitimately be subsumed under these three in so far as they are veridical. There is no comparative evaluation of these in respect of their veracity, though there may be such an evaluation from the standpoint of the importance of their fields of application. Madhva affirms that the summit of wisdom lies in a synthesis of these three. A fine statement to this effect may be quoted.

"*Śāstrārthayukto'nubhavaḥ pramāṇaṁ tūttamaṁ matam*|
Madhyamaṁ tvāgamo jñeyaḥ pratyakṣam adhamaṁ smṛtam|

Pratyakṣayorāgamayoḥ–virodhe niścayāya tu|
Anumādayaḥ na svatantrāḥ prāmāṇya –padavīm yayuḥ."[4]

(f) *Pratyakṣa* is perceptual cognition. Its distinguishing characteristic is that it is immediate and direct. This immediacy is secured through the instrumentality of the sensory mechanism. What the senses are we shall see presently. A capital point of significance about this mode of knowledge is that Madhva does not entertain the view that perception is a reconstruction of the external object concerned through the clues supplied by the subjective or mental representation of objects. In other words, he denies the theory of 'representative perception' and all the subjectivist edifice built on it as in the philosophy of Berkeley and *Vijñāna-vāda*. This is a theory of direct realism. This source of knowledge is basal to the entire structure of knowledge and it has no vitiating subjectivity. We may recall Madhva's thesis that perception can be corrected only by an enlarged and enhanced perception. No reasoning or scripture can cancel the deliverances of perception for the simple reason that they subsist on it. It is the *upajīvya-pramāṇa* for them. They rest on it. They may reveal a wider range and a deeper level of reality but cannot cut it out of the kingdom of truth. Some theories such as those of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism and Advaita posit a primitive phase of perception in which indeterminate awareness of the object is held to take place and rush to interpret the indeterminate disclosure in support of their special metaphysical doctrines of pluralism, or atomic particularism or non-dualism. Dvaita discountenances the venture and declares the 'indeterminate perception' (*nirvikalpa—pratyakṣa*) to be a psychological fiction. All perception is determinate and discovers reals characterized by determinate attributes. There is no perceptual revelation of substances and qualities in mutual disconnection, or of atomic perishing particulars, or of pure being bereft of differentiating attributes.

The sensory mechanism is of three layers. The outermost layer consists of the well-known five senses of seeing, hearing, and so on. They furnish information about particular data of experience

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4. *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, II. i, 18.

in their severality. The layer beneath it is *manas* or mind. This presides over the functioning of the outer senses and co-ordinates their data. It prepares their messages for acting upon them on the part of the agent. If this is its function supervising on the function of the other senses, it has its own special function also. It is the inner sense that brings about memory or recollection. There has been some debate in Indian philosophy whether memory can be regarded as a form of valid cognition. If memory plays a trick and what is an occurrence of the past is placed in the present, it no doubt is invalid. This is what Bergson would call habit-memory capable of mechanistic explanation. It is a specific recollection of a past event as past, and there is no confusion between the *time of recollecting* and the *time recollected*; it is genuine recollection which Bergson utilizes in his famous refutation of Materialism.[5] Such a memory is surely a mode of objectively valid experience. Dvaita, in a similar spirit, admits the objectivity of memory. But this is no additional way of knowing. As it is just a recovery of the *kevala-pramāṇa* of the past, it is no additional category of knowing. The *manas* has several aspects, enumerated in the psychological conventions of Indian thought, such as *citta*, *ahaṁkāra*, *buddhi*. But its primary functions are two, the supervision of the material furnished by the other senses and the causation of recollection. The inmost layer of perceptual equipment is the knowing self in its capacity as knower. In its absence no knowledge can arise through the senses and the mind. The latter presents their message to the self's cognizance. The self in this aspect of the knower or witness is called the '*Sākṣin*'. This is a technical innovation in Dvaita epistemology and is of great consequence. The concept implies that the self in its intrinsic nature is a knower. This knowership in relation to the manifold and even fleeting objects is a metaphysical fact. It is doubtful whether the *Ātman* in Advaita can be described in its ultimate nature as a *Sākṣin*, for the term has meaning in relation to the objective realm witnessed and as such carries dualistic implications. This dualism is a fact for Dvaita, and hence the *Sākṣin* is a

5. ***Matter and Memory.*** **This is endorsed surprisingly by B. Russell in *Analysis of Mind*, page 166.**

fundamental verity. Since it is an unmediated perceiver, its experiencing is absolutely objective and true. What does it experience? Even as the *manas* aids the cognition of the external world presented through the other senses and has its own specific content by way of recollection, the *Sākṣin* has three fields of perception. It cognizes the external world through the senses as passed through the *manas*. It also perceives the data presented by the *manas* by way of recollection. It has its own sphere of objects. In recognizing this sphere of special objects to be perceived by the *Sākṣin*, the Dvaita account departs radically from Advaita, in spite of the sameness of the term, *Sākṣin*. The consciousness of the pure self for the other school is never directed to any object, and it is only the conditioned self as *Jiva* affected by the adjuncts that lapses into object-focussed awareness.

The significance of the concept of the *Sākṣin* is enhanced when we note the Dvaita enumeration of the objects that it perceives autonomously. The self by virtue of its character as *Sākṣin* cognizes itself immediately. Self-consciousness is the fundamental differentia of the self and that is exercised through the *Sākṣin*. While in action, the subject cannot be the same as the object; in the matter of awareness or *Jñapti*, there is no contradiction involved in self-knowing. It is this knowing that lies at the basis of all other knowing and renders the self a "self". Some kind of self-consciousness must be an inevitable character of the *Ātman*. This is what is normally signified by terms such as '*Svayaṁ-prakāśa*' or '*Svataḥ-siddha*' or '*pratyak*'. This self—knowing is unique and there is no need to import into the normal dualistic implication of subject-object relation. The self is cognized as the self and not as a non-self. What happens to the self by way of pleasure and pain and also the absence of these, is cognized through the *Sākṣin*. The self, according to Dvaita, is a *bhokta* experiencing this duality in its intrinsic nature. It may be recalled that one of the proofs for the reality of the self adduced by the *Sāṅkhya* school is this very fact of *bhoktṛtva*. As Descartes argued following his 'Cogito ergo sum', Dvaita holds that the self is aware of its own insufficiency in the matter of knowledge. In other words, it is conscious of its own *avidyā*.

This *avidyā* is also made known by virtue of the *Sākṣin*. It is well-known that Advaita faces extreme difficulty in accounting for the possibility of the experience of the root-*avidyā* on the part of the pure *Ātman*. *Avidyā* is a phenomenal category; and its nature, as such, is that it exists only by way of presentation to a consciousness. But the conditioned self is already within the hold of *avidyā*. How could the pure and objectless self ever experience *avidyā* is an unanswerable question. It is duly consigned to the limbo of the 'inexplicable'. In Dvaita there is a frank admission of the finite self's awareness of its own deficiency. If these are the disclosures of the *Sākṣin* about the self, it has certain other equally significant disclosures about the world. There has been a perennial problem about the perception of time and space in both eastern and western philosophy. They seem to be matters of perception, but they are pre-supposed by the perception of particular spaces and times. They are essentially integral unities. In answer to this problem Kant formulated his doctrine that they are '*a priori* forms of intuition', thereby making them "transcendentally ideal", however pressingly real they may seem to empirical consciousness. An alternative solution is effected in Dvaita. It holds that the self by virtue of its nature as *Sākṣin* perceives space and time as integral totalities. They are not forms of intuition in the Kantian way, but are objects of primary intuition. When we note that location in space and time is itself taken as the standard of reality for physical reality, in making space and time fundamental facts in the experience of the self, realism with regard to the external world is wrought into the basic structure of consciousness.

This description of the *Sākṣin* has momentous consequences for the resulting metaphysics. The self on one hand is a 'personal' reality for, self-affirmation is the essence of personality and the world of space and time is an indubitable reality, for they form basic datum of the self's primeval experience.

(g) The next *anu-pramāṇa* is *anumāna* or inference. The theory of inference has a long history in Indian thought. Its subject-matter has a kind of sacred sanction in the Upaniṣadic inculcation of *manana* and *jijñāsā*. Its full shape was delineated

by the early Nyāya philosophers such as Gautama and Vātsyāyana. Then the interest seems to have migrated into Buddhism, very much contrary to the Buddha's denunciation of the speculative exercise of the intellect and Nāgārjuna's self-annihilating polemics against all positive categories. The two greatest logicians of medieval Indian thought were Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Their logical contribution seems to be a curious by-product. They saw in the primitive apprehension of *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa* the only access to ultimate reality and regarded the later phases of thought particularly inference, as dealing in fictitious conceptual constructions. How the procedure supported their metaphysical views is not our concern. But in spite of this attitude to inference, they brought out the nature of inference well and relentlessly attacked the early Brahminical logicians of the Nyāya school. The later Nyāya philosophers, beginning with Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Udayana revived the Nyāya theory in a splendid shape and practically superseded the Buddhist logicians partly by assimilating their worthwhile innovations and partly by sustained attack on other elements. Somewhat at this stage the Advaitic dialectician Śrī Harṣa, borrowed the style of Nāgārjuna and his commentators, and launched a complete attack on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, in the interest of Advaitic idealism, for Nyāya was then the most powerful of the realistic philosophies. But the Renaissance of Nyāya Logic was already in the ascendancy and the founder of *Navīna Nyāya*, the reputed Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, built up the Nyāya logic and epistemology into a magnificent structure. It is this heritage of logical theory that passed into the Dvaita philosophy. It perfected the theory further and chiselled the details.

In reality Dvaita does not introduce many major innovations into the theory of inference. It does repeat the attack on the anti-logical doctrines of Buddhism and Śrī Harṣa. Madhva relies for his logical theory on an ancient work called *Brahma-Tarka.* He quotes from it profusely. It has bequeathed to him and his school the principal elements of the science of Logic.[6]

6. See Sri C. R. Krishna Rao's important work, *Madhva and Brahma-Tarka.*

On two points there seems to be deviation from the current theory of Nyāya. In Nyāya three types of concomitant relations are said to generate the inferential procedure. They are positive concomitance, (*anvaya-vyāpti*), the negative concomitance (*vyatireka-vyāpti*), and the joint concomitance of *anvaya-vyatireka*. The Dvaita school rejects the inference supposed to be based on negative concomitance. In this it agrees with Kumārila and Viśiṣṭādvaita. In current logical theory, two types of inference were distinguished, inference for oneself and inference for another. Particular care was taken to lay down the exact form of the latter which was meant to communicate a piece of reasoning which had convinced the person communicating. The Dvaita logical theory does not countenance such meticulous attention to this secondary form of inference. On the whole, we may say, Dvaita adopts to a large measure the logical theory of Nyāya as corrected by *Brahma-Tarka*.

(h) The next *anu-pramāṇa* is *śabda* or verbal testimony. There are two preliminary questions about this *pramāṇa*. Is verbal testimony a valid source of knowledge? Is it a separate source, not reducible to inference and perception? On both, Dvaita along with all the exegetical Vedic philosophers, such as the Mīmāṁsakas and other Vedāntins adopts a definite position. On the strength of the *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* principle and allied conceptions, Dvaita argues for the absolute indispensability of the admission of this source of knowledge. It further demonstrates the impossibility of construing this mode of knowledge as a subdivision of the other modes of knowledge, particularly *anumāna*.

The other issues connected with this *pramāṇa* can be broadly divided into two kinds. There are some general problems connected with all verbal authorities and sources of information. They relate to the general nature of linguistic communication and comprehension of such communication. In this field there are a great many speculations in Indian thought such as those of the grammarians, the Mīmāṁsaka exegetists, writers on poetic expression and Buddhist logicians. Following the Nyāya philosophers, almost every school of Indian philosophy has been obliged to

clarify its stand on these issues. There are some special problems in connection with the interpretation of sacred testimony, particularly the supposedly impersonal and eternal embodiment of ultimate wisdom in the Scriptures of Vedānta. Dvaita adopts definite stands on these twin fields of interpretation. With regard to language in general, the problems are: What constitutes a word? What constitutes the meaning of a term? What is the nature of the apprehension of the meaning of a sentence? How to determine the purport of a discourse? On what constitutes a word, the grammarian Bhartṛhari and following him, somewhat curiously, the Vedāntin Maṇḍana Miśra, propound the mystico-transcendentalist doctrine of *sphoṭa*, which seems to have originated, through force of analogy, from the poetic theory of *dhvani*. Dvaita counters this word-mysticism, *śabda-brahma-vāda*, decisively on lines popularised by the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsaka theorists and adopted by the other schools of Vedānta also. The meaning of a term may be conventional or etymologically derived, *rūḍhi* or *yoga*. These two types of signification are elaborated by Dvaita into several levels of *rūḍhi* and *yoga* and their combination. What the term signifies may be described as universal or particular or a combination of the two, with emphasis on the particular or universal. Dvaita discusses these alternatives closely and arrives at the conclusion that the word meaning is a specific something characterized by universal contents. There is a due recognition of intension and extension spoken of in Western Logic and signification of a term is ultimately a concrete universal, the stress being on the concreteness. It may be that the term may have an abstract and generalized sense by itself, but when it participates in a significant complex of a statement it aquires specificity of reference.[7]

There are two theories in connection with meaning put forward by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Buddhists respectively. The former affirm that the primary function of words and linguistic communication in general is to prompt an action by the presentation of a task to be performed or an obligation to be fulfilled

7. See Wittgenstein's *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 47 : "Names resemble points : propositions resemble arrows."

and not to reveal an existent state of affairs. We have already seen that Dvaita refutes this psychology of language. The Buddhist theory holds that '*apoha*' or negation is the purpose of terms. A term does not signify what anything is, but *its not being what it is not*. Negation is the primary motive behind every statement. But pure negation not based on the positive discernment of what justifies the negation is impossible. Every significant negation is rooted in affirmation and only defines it. Dvaita rejects this nihilistic approach to language. In this it conforms practically to the finding of all other schools of Indian philosophy. There are two theories about the comprehension of a sentence. According to *Abhihitānvaya-vāda* advanced by the Kumārila school of Mīmāṁsā, the words of a sentence are grasped first in their severality and then the integration of their meanings takes place in a subsequent act of understanding. According to the school of Prabhākara, the primary grasp of the meaning of the constituent words of the sentence itself involves the grasp of their inter-relation and there is only a single act of apprehension. Interestingly enough, the two traditions in Advaita seem to be divided on the question.[8] Dvaita conclusively subscribes to the Prābhākara standpoint and supplements it by its own arguments.

On the procedure for discovering the final purport of a discourse or passage with a single unit of thought there seems to have been an established canon which is sought to be acted upon by all schools of Vedic exegesis. It enumerates the clues or grounds for determining the import of the discourse. They are called *tātparya-liṅgas*. Madhva too relies upon it in the matter and quotes the canon as enunciated in an ancient text.[9]

upakrama-upasaṁharau abhyāso'pūrvatā phalam |
arthavādopapattica liṅgaṁ tātparyanirṇaye ||

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8. See *Citsukhi*, page 155.

9. *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, I. i, 4.

The opening and conclusion, frequent reiteration, uniqueness of an idea, the idea to which the promise of a reward is attached, commendatory legends and myths etc,, and the actual reasoning employed are the grounds enumerated. All these are well illustrated in the instruction of Uddālaka to Śvetaketu in the *Chāndogya*. They should be used as guides for construing the central purport of a discourse or passage. They furnish the rational basis for one's understanding of a text and constitute the logic of textual interpretation.[10]

After these general considerations affecting the source of knowledge constituted of verbal testimony, we have to concern ourselves with the special problems connected with the Vedāntic scripture, namely, the Vedas culminating in the *Upaniṣads* and Madhva's manner of meeting them. There are two circumstances which determine the course of discussion in this connection. We can no longer deal with the formal problems, as in dealing with the general problems. Secondly, Madhva was preceded by a very heavy interpretative tradition concerning the *Upaniṣads.* Therefore we are obliged to enter into the actual philosophy taught in the *Upaniṣads* and also to define Madhva's point of view as against the prevailing tradition of Vedāntic exegesis, to which he was fundamentally opposed. His method was construction through criticism. The tradition that he subjected to criticism was the Advaitic tradition crystallized through a galaxy of celebrated writers. In the process of doing justice to this approach of Madhva, we are inevitably led to anticipate a great deal of the other aspects of the philosophy of Madhva, particularly its ontological theories; and it may well be the right beginning to the study of Madhva's metaphysics.

It is a happy feature of the discusslon that we can distinguish the outstanding issues and they fortunately have very great philosophical importance. The right method of presentation in the context would be a statement of the Advaitic positions and then take into account Madhva's critical reaction. Finally we may

10. I deeply appreciate Agnihotri Vadirajacharya's masterly summary of Madhva's Epistemology and Logic, in his *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha.*

conclude with a brief enunciation of Madhva's positive understanding of the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*.

(1) Advaita contends that the ultimate Reality taught in the *Upaniṣads* is Brahman which has no internal distinctions such as quality and it is one in essence with our essential Self. But language consisting of words can apply only to what has qualitative grounds justifying the use of words. Further, words apply to objects and not to the subject, and hence they cannot apply to Brahman. The *Upaniṣads* themselves affirm that the final reality is beyond words. Hence the only method by which verbal testimony can indicate it is by indirect and secondary signification.

Madhva takes this as a serious challenge to the whole of Vedāntic philosophy which seeks to build up its theory of ultimate Reality on the basis of scriptural authority. He does not admit that Brahman is devoid of qualities. On the contrary it abounds in qualities of the nature of perfections. It is not true that Brahman is substantially identical with the Self in man. It is not also correct to restrict the scope of language to external objects. When the Vedas say that Brahman is beyond words, they intend to convey its uniqueness, immensity and stunning greatness. Even the statement that it is beyond words is a method of conveying its unique majesty. Perhaps it is itself a most effective method in the situation. In fact, we use words ordinarily in an incorrect fashion and do only partial justice to their potency. When they are stretched to their full extent of natural meaning, they cannot signify anything but Brahman. Viṣṇu is in reality the ultimate denotation of all terms. Madhva devotes a whole *adhikaraṇa* in his *Sūtra-bhāṣya* (I, i, 5) for establishing the accessibility of Viṣṇu to words, though he is sure that His splendour exceeds our utmost powers of glorification. Even words normally significatory of what is imperfect and even evil, when properly elucidated, are transmuted into naming the supreme Godhead.[11] As for secondary signification, nothing that is really beyond all words can ever be conveyed through secondary reference.

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11. The fourth *pāda* of I *adhyāya* of the *Brahma-sūtra* has this theme.

(2) An entirely different point is sought to be established in another argument. We have a definition of Brahman in *Taittirīya Upaniṣad.* It has several parallels in all the other *Upaniṣads.* It runs thus: 'Brahman is real, knowledge and infinite.' Here the substantive, the subject being defined, is 'Brahman'. To it three predicates 'real, knowledge and infinite' are applied by the defining proposition. How are we to understand the proposition? It is the same, identical, subject that is being defined. Its unity is a paramount consideration. If the proposition is taken as discerning in it or ascribing to it three attributes, conveyed by the three predicates, its unity is broken. The definition splits up the integral unity of the subject of definition. It reads into it internal qualitative distinctions. The purpose of the definition cannot be more devastatingly defeated. Then how are we to understand it? The Advaitin has a theory called *akhaṇḍārtha-vāda.* He maintains that the predicates are not to be taken affirmatively, in which case the breaking up of the unity of the subject is inevitable. Not merely will there be a distinction among the qualities ascribed, there will be a distinction between the substantive and qualities, and within the substantive itself, what is qualified by 'real' must be different from what is qualified by 'knowledge', and the two from what is qualified by 'infinite'. In order to avoid this disaster, the Advaitin instructs that the predicates must be understood negatively. 'Real' means 'other than the unreal'. 'Knowledge' means 'other than insentience'. 'Infinite' means 'other than the 'finite'. It is this negative demarcation that the definition accomplishes. Nothing is read into the subject, but only three possible or actual misconceptions about it are eliminated.

The Dvaita tradition looks upon this whole dialectical exercise as misconceived. In the first place, functional analysis of substance and attribute and the several attributes is no ontological separation. The fear of breaking up the integral unity of the subject by the fact of attributing to it one or more features proceeds from the failure to grasp the principle of *viśeṣa,* which we meet with later on in greater explicitness. The negative interpretation of even the manifestly affirmative predicates is a veiled adoption of the *apoha-*

vāda. The exclusions proposed of what are opposed to the 'real, knowledge and infinite' cannot serve to define Brahman, unless they belong to it qualitatively. The benefit of the exclusion must somehow accrue to the subject. If it does, the theory simply predicates of the subject three negations.

If the negations make a difference to the subject and are also not mutually tautologous, the entire difficulty raised in connection with affirmative predicates re-appears with undiminished force. Thus there is no escape from admitting the qualitative characterization of the subject in the proposition. The *akhaṇḍārtha* way of making the Upaniṣadic definitions of Brahman yield the concept of an attributeless Brahman fails and must logically fail.[12]

(3) It is an open secret that the Vedāntic scriptures contain a good deal of Brahman-*jiva* dualistic teachings, those that conceive of Brahman and the *jiva* as fundamentally different. There are connected passages elaborating the implications of this distinction. The existence of such clear texts of Dvaita import is a problem that Advaita has to meet, if it has to justify its assertion of the fundamental identity of the *Paramātman* with the *jivātman*, as the teaching of *Vedānta*.

Advaita offers an explanation. It asserts that these texts which speak of the distinction between the supreme Self and the finite self and the connected idea of the reality of the external world are just repeating the dualistic, pluralistic and theistic matter drawn from the pre-Vedāntic stage of knowledge for purposes of getting them sublated by the final monistic texts. The latter correct the idea of the theistic God into that of the impersonal Absolute. They analyse the two aspects of the *jiva* the pure Self and its empirical adjuncts constitutive of the phenomenal individual, and assimilate the pure Self into the ultimate Self and negate the reality of phenomenal individuality. They

12. See F. H. Bradley's discussion in the Second Chapter of his *Appearance and Reality*. The problem of a 'lump of sugar being both sweet and hard' is an interesting parallel. See also *Anuvyākhyāna* on the second *Sūtra* and the *Sudhā* thereon.

further discard the external worlds as unreal. For these negations to take place, there is a need to represent what is to be negated and that is what the dualistic texts do, by repeating for eventual cancellation what are the matters of fact of mundane understanding.

One of the several weighty contributions of that nuclear classic of Madhva, the *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya* is its masterly discussion of this position. It splits the problem into two sections and takes up the estimate of the dualistic texts first and then attends to the monistic texts supposed to cancel them.

It cannot be maintained that popular consciousness can pose the distinction between God and the individual self, for God is not a matter of empirical certainty. His existence itself is to be proved on the basis of scripture. Scripture seems to be concocting a needless blunder in order to enjoy the felicity of self-correction. If this whole alternative is rejected and if it is held that God's being is well-established through extrascriptural sources of knowledge, how can that finding be sublated by scripture? No *pramāṇa* can be valid if it runs in contradiction to what is established by another *pramāṇa*. That is the general well-settled position of all devotees of *s'ruti*, and it is part of the basic epistemology of all schools of Vedānta. In that case, far from *s'ruti* cancelling the well-established dualism, its so-called non—dualistic texts suffer cancellation. There is a third alternative that the dualism in question is not so well-established in empirical thought and is hazy and uncertain.

In that case, the dualistic texts invest it with authenticity by its own pronouncement to that effect and the weak intimations of popular thought are converted to absolute truth, in power and authority. It is no reiteration for subsequent elimination, but a confirmation and amplification. So the procedure adopted for doing away with the dualism that forms an integral part of Upaniṣadic revelation is logically unworkable.

Now to turn to the non-dualistic texts. All the important texts of this description in the principal *Upaniṣads*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyka*, the *Māṇḍūkya*, their supposedly most monistic

discourses, are subjected to detailed examination. The entire teaching of Uddālaka to Śvetaketu, Yājñavalkya's final address to Maitreyī, and the *Māṇḍūkya* passage proclaiming the *prapañca* to be *māyā-mātra* are taken up as textual totalities and also in detail, and are demonstrated to contain no elements of the imputed non-dualism of the *Paramātman* and *Jivātman*. The higher reserves of the *Upaniṣads*, according to Advaita, are also innocent of the Advaita in question and they deepen and supplement the teachings of the dualistic texts sought to be disregarded. We cannot go into the details of this inetrpretative demonstration. Its central drift is our chief concern. So Madhva contends that the supreme purpose of *śruti* is not non-dualism of the type propounded in Advaita.

(4) In almost all his works, Madhva affirms what he regards as the pervasive and supreme theme of the Vedic scripture. He names it the "*mahātātparya*", making the prefix '*mahā*–' qualify not some sentences, as in Advaita, such as '*Tattvamasi*', '*Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*', '*Ayamātmā Brahma*', and '*Prajñānaṁ Brahma*' but the '*tātparya*', meaning the theme or subject-matter. It is an explication of the Upaniṣadic term 'Mahā–jñeyam'.[13] This *mahātātparya*, for Madhva, is Viṣṇu. He is the encompassing concern of the entire body of Vedic revelation. We have already come across the supporting declaration in *Harivaṁśa*, that in the beginning, the centre, and the conclusion, Hari is the Being glorified in the *Veda*, *Bhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Purāṇa*. The *Viṣṇu-tattva-ṇirṇaya* adds a further point. It is not merely that Viṣṇu is spoken of everywhere, but that this *sarvotkarṣa*, His all-surpassing eminence or majesty is spoken of everywhere. *The supreme subject–matter* of the revelation is, therefore, the supremacy of Viṣṇu. The *mahātātparya* of the sacred texts in their totality is the *māhātmya* of Viṣṇu. According to Madhva, this thesis is presented in the *Gitā* itself in the twin declarations '*Vedaiḥ sarvaiḥ aham eva vedyaḥ*' and "*uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyaḥ paramātmetyudāhṛtaḥ*".[14]

13. *Mahā-nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad.*
14. *VTV*, p-125.

This transcendent supremacy of Viṣṇu, the single theme of Vedānta, is affirmed in several ways, and this constitutes their convergent point of significance. Jaya Tīrtha in his *Sudhā* gives an idea of these several types of affirmations, and each type enumerated brings out the style and direction of countless illustrative Vedāntic texts. They together comprehend all the principal modes of revelation. It is worthwhile going over the types mentioned by Jaya Tīrtha and see how much each of them comprises ".[15]

(a) " *Kānicit sarvajñatva - sarveśvaratva - sarvāntaryāmitva—soundarya - audārya - guṇa - viśiṣṭatayā* ". A big set of texts proclaims that Brahman is possessed of excellences such as omniscience, over-lordship, over all existence, all-embracing immanence, beauty and bountifulness. All the countless *saguṇa* texts of the *Upaniṣads* stand identified and summed up in this description. Brahman is infinite intelligence, infinite in sovereign power, infinitely present everywhere and through all eternity and in all things ruling them within, and infinite beauty and infinite compassion. The entire bulk of *saguṇa-śruti* is compressed herein.

(b) "*Kānicit apahatapāpmatva-nirduḥkhatva-prākṛta-bhautika-vigraharahitatvādi-doṣābhāva viśiṣṭatayā*". There are countless Vedic passages which deny of Brahman sin, affliction, materiality and such other imperfections. All texts that speak of Brahman as *nirguṇa* are included in this description. The limitations and blemishes characteristic of the finite self and matter are in their totality negated of Brahman. Almost all the negative references to Brahman in the *Upaniṣads* are given their rightful significance here. This freedom from the infirnities of the *jiva* and *jagat* is also an excellence of Brahman. This is its negative excellence, even as the former is the positive excellence. They conjointly establish the transcendent perfection of the Supreme.

(c) " *Kānicit atigahanatā - jñāpanāya - vāgmanasagocaratvākāreṇa*" Some texts, with a view to intimate the unfathomable mystery and profundity of the Divine, affirm that it cannot be

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15. *Sudhā*, I, i, 6th *adhikaraṇa*.

reached by the mind and speech. This is explanatory of the mystic's confession of the ineffability of his experience and the oft-repeated saying in the *Upaniṣads* that the ultimate sends back thought and speech baffled. This is the meaning of "*avacanena provāca*", 'expounded through speechlessness'. Usually, the term '*avacanena*' is stressed in this sentence, but the term '*provāca*' should also receive equal stress. It is no mere speechlessness, but speechlessness that proclaims the tremendous mystery of the infinite presence exercising boundless fascination.

(d) "*Kānicit sarvaparityāgena tasyaiva upādānāya advitiyatvena*". Some texts speak of Brahman as one without a second. This does not mean the ontological non-dualism of Brahman, but that it is the axiological absolute, the sole object of human endeavour and aspiration, following the renunciation of every other interest. The *Māṇḍūkya* passage, '*advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ*' brings out this point unambiguously from the perspective of value, the ideal to be pursued. The attainment of Brahman is not an objective among other objectives. All else is to be discarded and then the quest after this consummation must be the only passion. It is difficult to count the passages that come under this description. All the non-dualistic texts are assimilated. The singleness of the final goal of man's life is the non-dualism preached in them.

(e) This may be alright with regard to the non-dualistic texts, which expressly adopt a negative manner of propounding non-dualism. But there are positive texts that Brahman is the soul of all, and as such it has to be meditated upon. They seem to be inculcating an ontological monism. Madhva himself in his *Sūtra-bhāṣya* (III-3-12) says that the essential nature of Brahman that should be contemplated upon in all devout meditation is that it is *sat, cit, ānanda* and *Ātman*. Jaya Tirtha brings forward the set of passages that make Brahman all in all: "*Kānicit sarvasattā-pratiti-pravṛtti-nimitta-pratipatyarthaṁ sarvātmatvena.*" With a view to include that the supreme Brahman is the cause of the existence, experience and activity of all entities, these passages speak of Brahman as the Soul or Ātman of all. Everything exists, experiences and is experienced and functions through

the power of Brahman, and hence Brahman is truly the centre and the moving spirit in all. This fact of the infinite cosmic immanence and causal power is the import of the affirmative monistic texts in the *Upaniṣads*.

Under these five all-including categories of Upaniṣadic texts Jaya Tīrtha subsumes the entire heritage of Vedāntic revelation. Even as *Pañcabheda* is mentioned again and again in Dvaita literature, this five-fold exposition of Brahman deserves to be mentioned. This is the *pañcaprakāra-pratipādana* of the *Paramātman.*

These five modes or types are not parallel modes but converge according to Jaya Tīrtha in presenting a single thesis. That thesis is: "*Sarvāṇyapi vedānta-vākyāni, asaṅkhyeya-kalyāṇa-guṇākaraṁ sakala-doṣa-gandhavidhuram, eka rūpam eva brahma nārāyanākhyaṁ pratipādayanti.*" 'Brahman is of one nature only and is the same as Nārāyaṇa. Nārāyaṇa is the ocean of infinite perfections and has no trace of any evil or imperfection.' Such is the fundamental and all-comprehensive teaching of the Vedāntic revelation, and the five modes described converge to proclaim the single truth.

May be, the whole passage of Jaya Tīrtha must be presented as a single unit.

सर्वाण्यपि वेदवाक्यान्यसंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरं सकलदोषगन्धविधुरमेकरूपमेव ब्रह्म नारायणाख्यं प्रतिपादयन्ति। किन्तु कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्व-सर्वेश्वरत्व-सर्वान्तर्यामित्व-सौन्दर्यौदार्यगुण-विशिष्टतया। कानिचिदपहतपाप्मत्व-निर्दुःखत्व-प्राकृतभौतिक-विग्रहरहितत्वादिदोषाभावविशिष्टतया। कानिचिदतिगहनताज्ञापनाय वाङ्मनस-अगोचरत्वाद्याकारेण। कानिचित्सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय-अद्वितीयत्वेन। कानिचित्सर्वसत्ताप्रतीति-प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन-इत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति।

Table of Metaphysical Categories



IV

As is inevitable, the account of the epistemology of Dvaita has already inducted us considerably to its ontology or theory of

reality. But still this part of the philosophy, which is in fact, its centre and core, must receive direct consideration.

There are two enunciations of the table of metaphysical categories. There is the table adopted in the later stages of the tradition. It enumerates ten categories, namely, *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (universal), *viśeṣa* (speciality), *sādṛśya* (similarity) *śakti* (power), *amśi* (whole composed of parts), *viśiṣṭa* (the qualified or distinguished), and *abhāva* (non-existence). There is a table, rather a tree, of the categories presented by Madhva himself in his *Tattva-saṁkhyāna* and *Tattva-viveka.*

The two lists cover the entire ground of Dvaita metaphysics. The first one is modelled on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika enumeration of categories, The second one brings out the characteristic metal physical position of the school. It is evident that the categories can be fruitfully dealt with under the three categories of Nature, the Individual Soul and God. The non-substance categories of the first list can be suitably brought in as and when it is necessary to do so.

A

With regard to Nature or the system of physical existence, two fundamental propositions must be enunciated as fixing its metaphysical status. The physical world is real and is not to be regarded as an illusion or a projection of the subject. All illusions presuppose a substratum and another real entity to which it is similar. On the basis of this similarity something totally non-existent is superposed on the substratum. For our world to be unreal, there must be a real world, and on its analogy the false world is to be imagined to exist in the place of the substratum. In other words, for the world to be illusory, there must be a real world as presupposition.[16] A total world-illusion is an impossibility. There are other countless objections to the hypothesis of the unreality of the external world. An illusory presentation is a derived phenomenon and its capacity to delude depends upon its claim to be a transcript of the real. Dream deludes

16. *VTV,* pp. 263-268.

because of its posing as a waking experience. If there is no waking experience at all, there can be no dream as psychological fact; and it can have no deceptive power either.

There is another way of doing away with the physical. It can be regarded as consciousness itself in an incipient or degraded state. That would be panpsychism. As this philosophical possibility is not much exploited in Indian thought, there is no need to consider it in detail. In principle it stands rejected by Madhva's thesis that neither matter nor spirit can be reduced to the other.[17]

So the first fundamental proposition about the physical world is that it is an irreducible ontological verity. The second should at once be added. It is not all that exists. In the first place, it does not generate the conscious spirits and does not hold the key to their philosophical explanation as the materialist vainly imagines. Its own existence, functions and intelligibility depend upon the supreme Spirit. It is sustained as what it is, through the power of Brahman, in both its static and dynamic aspects and even in its conceivability. This dependence in respect of *sattā-pravṛtti-pramiti,* is also an ultimate fact. This twofold determination of the ontological status of the material world furnishes the background to the entire philosophy of Nature in Dvaita. Time and space constitute together the matrix of all that is physical, and in fact its location in them constitutes the mark of its reality. As we have already noted, space and time are indubitable realities testified to by the experience of the *sākṣin.* The reality of all that occupies space and occurs in time is linked to the reality of space and time, which in its turn derives from the *sākṣin*'s primary experience. The Buddhists denied the Ātman and held the universe to be subject to total change, perceptible as well imperceptible. Dvaita denies this unqualified doctrine of mutability or what is called *kṣaṇika-vāda.* It asserts that there is a measure of immutability of fundamental substance in nature which admits of no absolute orgination and destruction. In the process of change that occurs in nature, there is the reign of causation. Now, causation is differently conceived in different

17. *Anuvyākhyāna,* I, iv, 24.

schools in Indian philosophy. There is the *pratitya-samutpāda-vāda* of early Buddhism, the *ārambha-vāda* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the *satkārya-vāda* of Sāṅkhya-Yoga and the *vivarta-vāda* of Advaita. Dvaita adopts a middle course in the controversy and names its theory *sadasatkārya-vāda*. It rejects the extreme views of *pratitya-samutpāda-vāda* and *vivarta-vāda*. It attempts a combination of the *ārambha-vāda* and *satkārya-vāda*, seeing the justice of emphasizing both the aspect of continuity in the causal process and that of the novelty of effects.

At this stage, it may be necessary to indicate the line of demarcation between the jurisdiction of the philosophy of Nature and that of the empirical sciences investigating into Nature by way of observation and experiment, and the ratiocination based upon them. The philosophy of Nature ought not to trespass into the field of science in matters of detail and run the risk of being set at nought by the advances in science. Nor can science legislate on the larger and speculative interpretations of its basic concepts, the presuppositions of its methodology and the metaphysical bearings of its discoveries. A scientist who ventures in this direction is not exercising any special authority, as he is engaged not in empirical investigation but in speculative and interpretative reflection in the role of a philosopher. From the Dvaita stnadpoint this division of the fields of inquiry is perfectly admissible, for it admits the absolute validity of *pratyakṣa* in its own field, and the philosopher is called upon to link the findings of perception to his ultimate concern with the supreme Being. Science discovers the "how" and "what" of a physical object and Vedānta discerns the divine principle at its foundation.

The bounds of what constitutes matter must be clearly understood. It consists of the objects of external Nature and the allied factors that go to constitute man's living organism. The latter consists of the same elements as external Nature and also some additional factors such as the life-principle, the sense-organs and the internal sense or *manas*. Early speculation analysed all these into five elements corresponding to the five senses. Some philosophers, such as the Jains, the Buddhists, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers

took the material world as consisting of the atoms. In other words, nature as we face it in our experience is an aggregation or combination of these atoms. This is to account for the world as a compound of further indivisible particles of the elements. We will overlook the differences among these schools of atomists. The main point is that they looked upon matter as a product of combination. Now the Sāṅkhya-Yoga went further and regarded the elements themselves and all the objects of Nature as the self-diversification of a single physical principle, which they named *prakṛti*, *avyakta* or *avyākṛta*. Nature as it is is due to a process of self-differentiation on the part of the original substance. The ground for this diversification is said to be found in the three basic and pervasive aspects called *guṇas—sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. From this origin, through a process of differentiation, the entire universe, in its macrocosmic and microcosmic spheres, is said to spring into existence. In this account also, some kind of a provision for dealing with the facts that atomism seemed to be explaining, is made in the distinction between *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas* and the doctrine of *pañcī-karaṇa*. These details need not be gone into for our purpose.

All the schools of Vedānta, inclusive of Dvaita, adopt this unitary conception of the basis of physical reality. With just this much of primordial matter, the cosmic process was held capable of explanation, by the Sāṅkhya school. This is vigorously controverted by all the schools of Vedānta. The Dvaita adds its own special arguments. It holds that unless the supreme Spirit or Brahman is admitted, the cosmology cannot be complete and satisfactory. Īśvara or Brahman is the ultimate source of the evolution of *prakṛti* into the state of explicit actuality. Īśvara brings the world into being, actuates it in its operations, and renders it understandable. He is the *hetu* of its '*sattā*', '*pravṛtti*', and '*pramiti*'.

What kind of cause does Īśvara constitute? Some schools opine that He is both the material and efficient cause of the world. Madhva opposes this position, as it would imply the

mutability of God as the material cause.[18] He is only the *nimitta-kāraṇa* and not also the *upādāna-kāraṇa*. Superficially viewed, this seems to be a limitation of God's causal power. But in reality the motive for the limitation is to maintain without compromise His changelessness, for obviously the material cause undergoes modification in the process of causation. But to depend on an alien material base would rob the creator of His self-sufficiency. To obviate this implication, Madhva insists that the base, even in its causal state, is dependent on God as wholly as the effect does. Its *sattā*, *pravṛtti* and *pramiti* are also drawn from that single source of all being, power and intelligibility. There is no dualism of two independent causal principles.[19] This is the reason for Madhva's refutation of *seśvara-sāṅkhya* and all schools that would reduce God to the role of an external mechanic requiring and limited by an independent material principle for creating the world.

Perhaps, this idea of the all-embracing dependence of the physical world on the supreme Being, Viṣṇu, is the final message of Madhva's philosophy of Nature. Viṣṇu comprehends the whole of external Nature as a field of existence permeated and sustained by His immanent presence in all its states, primordial as well as consequent. Thus, though Nature is a reality, He is all in all in it and in fact, it is a reality through His *anugraha* to that effect.

B

The natural transition from the philosophy of Nature is to the consideration of the philosophy of Dvaita concerning the *jīvātman* or the finite self. It forms a higher order of existence.

There are two basic propositions that set up the background and basis for the entire inquiry. The *jīvātman* is an entity not derived or produced from nature. Materialism is discarded by Dvaita as decisively and sharply as by all the other schools of Indian philosophy. It does not also subscribe to the semi-naturalistic thesis of early Buddhism that personality or the self is a

18. See his interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra*, 1-4-24 to 28.

19. *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, II, i, 5; II, i, 15-21; II, i, 37.

composite substance aggregated out of several physical and mental constituents and subject to dissolution. It holds that the self is an enduring and non-composite entity, which may undergo partial modifications in its career through the force of external factors, but its core remains abiding and unbroken. It is eternal and indissoluble. The second proposition about it is that it is no autonomous reality in total mastery of its being and destiny. It is *paratantra*, owing its *sattā-pravṛtti-pramiti*, existence, powers of action and cognizability, to the supreme Spirit. It passes from state to state, in the cosmic cycle of creation, subsistence, dissolution, in the life-sequence of birth, survival and death and in the sequence of consciousness by way of sleep, dream and waking, owing to the operation of the *Paramātman* to that effect. When the origin of an individual is spoken of, it is this change into a new state through the action of God, that is signified. Hence it falls into the realm of effects issuing from that universal source. This dependence on God is as ultimate a fact as its underivability *from*, and irreducibility *to*, matter.

The distinguishing character of a self is its self-awareness, and this self-awareness is what constitutes an *aham* or ego.[20] This 'ego' is a metaphysical category and is not to be confounded with the 'egoism' or 'egotism' characteristic of moral degeneration. There is no contradiction involved in the notion of self-awareness. Identity of the subject and object in a productive process may be a contradiction, but in the cognitive situation it is both free from contradiction and fundamental.[21] So the individual self is a self-aware ego or personality.

The *jīva* is further characterized as atomic, as incapable of division, and as an ultimate unit of existence. This is not to hold that it is a particle, like the so-called atoms of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Dvaita does not concede that the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika atoms are really atomic. The truly non-composite atom is the *jīvātman*. It is a centre of consciousness not possessing the

20. *VTV*, p. 230.

21. See Jaya Tīrtha on *VTV*, p. 337.

material property of extension. But why should it not be taken as *vibhu* (all-pervasive)? The principal reason for not doing so is that it is finite. Only the supreme Self can be non-composite as well as infinite. The term *aṇu* combines in itself the double connotation of non-compositeness and finitude. There will be one apparent difficulty in this notion. How does the self know the extensive realm of existence, comprising God, other individual selves and Nature, if it is just atomic? The answer lies in the fact that though the self is an atomic subject, its power of consciousness spreads beyond the centre, and its circumference can be the entire cosmos.[22]

This clarification brings up the next problem about the self. The Sāṅkhya and Advaita systems propound the doctrine that the self in its noumenal nature is pure sentience and that the empirical modes of consciousness such as knowing, volition and the experience of joys and sorrows do not characterize it. For Sāṅkhya, all of them involve change and the real *puruṣa* is changeless. For Advaita, there is the additional ground that they involve dualism, of the nature of subject-object relationship, and all dualism is false. Dvaita rejects this restriction of the dimensions of the life of the self. For one thing, the self is not so utterly a static spectator. The experiences also denied of it do not involve such radical alterations of substance as supported in the Buddhist account of experience. Cognition, volition, enjoyment and suffering themselves are processes possible only in self-identical and continuing subjects. They are phases of an integral life-process of a subject. The Advaitic denunciation of the dualism of subject and object is not tenable. However noumenal the self may be, its very essence lies in its self-conscious relation by way of conciousness to the world of objects, be they material or spiritual. Hence the *jīvātman* in its real nature is a *jñātā* (knower), *kartā* (agent of actions), and *bhoktā* (the experiencer of pleasures and pains). How these aspects are combined in the self without breaking up its unity will engage us, when we take up the category of *viśeṣa*.

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22. *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, II, iii, 20–26.

The next question is a numerical one. Is there a plurality of selves or a single self? Advaita regards the basic Ātman as one, and the empirical selves which bear the differentiating experiences are many but are merely appearances set up by falsifying adjuncts. For Dvaita, the diversity of experience belongs to the selves themselves and as such the selves must be regarded as many in reality. The neat bifurcation of the self into the pure consciousness and the actual experiencer in the cognitive, volitional and emotional spheres, so that the pluralizing experiences can be conveniently assigned to the latter is discarded in Dvaita. The empirical self is a dimension of the real self. Further, the hypothesis of adjuncts functioning to produce the phenomenal plurality of selves is riddled with contradictions. Are we to regard the adjuncts as real? If they are, the dualism of the Ātman and *upādhis*, the spirit and its adjuncts, follows by logical necessity. Are they also phenomenal and illusory? How could an adjunct which itself is not there, set up the appearance of a false self? We have no instance, argues Madhva, of a 'false adjunct' producing a distorted presentation. Moreover, the adjunct itself would require an adjunct to account for its presentation. The difficulties are numerous and interminable.[28] Hence, the plurality of the finite selves must be admitted as a metaphysical fact.

There is another and obviously more important aspect of the numerical problem. Is the finite self one in substance with the absolute self or is it a different entity altogether? We have already seen that the *śruti* passages differentiating the two cannot be explained away and the supposed non-dualistic texts do not yield the import required by the differenceless Absolutism of Advaita. If the finite self's experiences of imperfection are veridical and the perfections attributed to Brahman characterize it truly, there can be no possibility of identifying the two. The essence of the *jīva* is no pure consciousness bereft of its individualing self-experience in terms of finitude in matters such as knowledge and joy. Brahman is no qualityless pure sentience (*nirguṇa caitanya*) devoid of precisely those differentiating perfections by virtue of

23. *VTV*, p. 275, and p. 285.

which it is the infinite spirit. Hence the identification of the two built upon the two-fold negation of what is intrinsic to the *jiva* on the one hand and also of what is intrinsic to Brahman on the other is a totally insupportable thesis. A sentience that is not self-awareness or object-awareness passes from the realm of reality to that of the 'void' of the Mādhyamikas.[24] Hence the *jīvātman* is fundamentally other than the *Paramātman*. This is no provisional difference obtaining in the condition of *saṁsāra* to be got over in the final blessedness of release.[25] Madhva affirms the continuance of the difference in the state of *mokṣa* or release also. The scriptural texts supporting the position are cited. If uniqueness is the essence of the self, the passing away of it would constitute annihilation rather than salvation.

In addition to the ineradicable differences of selves among themselves and their difference from God or Brahman, there is a further fact about them. They form a natural hierarchy based on gradations of worth, inherent in their basic nature. The position is supported on the authority of revelation. The gradation persists in the state of release also. What is more, at the bottom of the hierarchy there are two classes of souls that are evil beyond remedy, one condemned by nature to perpetual transmigration and the other predestined by nature for eternal damnation.[26] This is a hard doctrine, but Madhva sees it as the meaning of certain definite texts. This doctrine of souls inherently incapable of emancipation is not so special to Madhva as supposed. It is a familiar conception, though not prevalent in the history of religious thought. It is there emphatically asserted in certain sects of Christianity. Among recent philosophers of religion, Brightman comes to the conclusion that there are 'surd' evils that cannot be obliterated. This is a near enough parallel. In Jainism[27] there is a distinction drawn between *bhavya-jivas* and *abhavya-jivas*.

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24. *VTV*, p. 338.
25. *VTV*, pp. 222–243.
26. *Tattva-saṁkhyāna*, verses 4–5.
27. *Jaina Philosophy* by Mohanlal Mehta, page 209; see also *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, II chap., sūtra, 7.

The latter are said to have no possibility of salvation. Vedānta Deśika alludes to the existence of such a point of view,[28] in a kindred sect. In Dvaita, this view is called *tāratamya-vāda.*

Now we come to what may be described as the crowning point in the philosophy of the finite self. The self is differentiated from the supreme Being. It is also spoken of as one with it. There is the reconciling proposition that is a part or *aṁśa* of God. The concept of *aṁśa* is definitely applied to the *jiva,* in several *śruti* texts, in the *Bhagavad-gitā* and also in the *Brahma-sūtra.* This is fully accepted by Madhva, with a necessary clarification. There are two kinds of parts. By a part, a constituent part of the essential substance of the divine Reality may be meant, between which and the whole there is really no distinction except by virtue of *viśeṣa,* which does not divide. The *Bhāgavatam* signifies this conception when it says of Kṛṣṇa:*kṛṣṇastu bhagavān svayam,* aptly quoted by Madhva. Now this interpretation of *aṁśa* does not suit the present context as the difference between the *jiva* and the *Paramātman* is an ultimate fact. There is another sense of *aṁsa.* It may mean what belongs to the central principle in an inseparable way and bears to it kinship of nature, in spite of being a different entity. This is called *vibhinaṁśa* and not *svarūpāṁśa* as the *aṁśa* in the former sense is described. The *jīva* is different from the Supreme. But it is entirely dependent on it and bears towards it a thousand relationships of dependence. It shares with it the attributes such as knowledge and joy though in its own infinitesimal measure, as conferred by it. So absolute numerical difference, utter dependence and partial likeness of nature are the points of significance in the concept of *vibhinnaṁśa.* The *jīva* is such an *aṁśa* of Brahman. The appropriate metaphor to bring out this three-fold significance is that of an image of reflection, *pratibimba,* for an image is different from the original, is totally dependent on it, and bears resemblance to it. But the metaphor may cause confusion, as it is used in a different sense in the Advaita school, particularly in the Vivaraṇa-tradition. There the reflection is something unreal and is generated in a reflecting

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28. *Tattvamuktakalāpa,* II chap., verses 27–28,

medium or adjunct. In Madhva's use, the term *pratibimba* does not carry the implication of unreality and the operation of an adjunct by way of medium. The *jiva* is an eternal and absolutely real image of Viṣṇu, and the only condition that brings about its character as an image is its own essential nature. Hence it is called *svarūpopādhika-pratibimba* or *nirupādhika-pratibimba.*[29] The conception is quite clear, if only we set aside the terminalogical affinity to Advaita. To reflect on the nature of *jiva*, is to be irresistably drawn to Īśvara, who surpasses it immeasurably, who sustains it and imparts to it partial affinity of nature. The *pratibimba* truly carries an intimation of the original *bimba*, even as Hanumān carried the message of his master, Śrī Rāmacandra.

The finite self's dependence on God is a perennial theme of Dvaita Vedānta. In the first place, its being (*sattā*), activity (*pravṛtti*), and intelligibility (*pramiti*), flow from Him. God's cosmic activity is eight-fold.[30] It consists of creation, maintenance, dissolution, regulation, obscuration of knowledge, illumination, bondage and emancipation. Of these the first four functions are to be interpreted in relation to the individual self suitably, as they do not apply to it in the way they do to insentient nature. The second set of four functions applys only to the self. God casts the souls into sāṁsāric ignorance, when they deserve it, and brings to them saving illumination. He is the causal power behind their bondage, in accordance with their blemishes of deed and thought, and He liberates them in gracious response to their efforts in that direction. In these four functions, His righteous might as well as mercy is operative. All that is good and uplifting, and all that carries the joy of self-fulfilment flow from His grace alone. His grace is the paramount source of blessedness of all grades. This truth is embodied in a sublime passage: '*Ajñānam jñānado viṣṇu, jñāninām mokṣadaḥsca saḥ*; *ānandadaḥsca muktānām sa eva eko janārdanaḥ.*'[31] Viṣṇu is the giver of knowledge to those who are ignorant; He is the giver of liberation

29. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, II, ii, 10.

30. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I, i, 2.

31. *VTV*, p. 129.

to the enlightened; and He, the same Janārdana, imparts *ānanda* to the liberated. Both knowledge, which is the means of liberation, and the end which is liberation, are His gracious gifts. Even in liberation it is His grace that fills the *jiva* with the abundance of joyous life. The philosophy of the finite self may be fittingly closed with this homage to divine grace, in which it has to live, move and have its being.

C

All the inquiries, whether epistemological or those concerning nature and the finite individual lead up ultimately to the heart of Dvaita metaphysics, the consideration of the supreme Reality, Brahman or Viṣṇu. He is the self-dependent centre of the metaphysical situation. As He is self-distinguishing absolute self, He is eminently personal and hence the *Gitā* fittingly describes Him as *Puruṣottama.*

We have seen that He and His infinite eminence is the supreme import of the Vedic revelation. Further, He is not knowable through the other sources of knowledge. Sense-perception is confined to material entities and cannot reach to the height of revealing Him. Inference clarifies and co-ordinates what is presented by the two other sources of knowledge and can reveal nothing by itself. When it does exceed the bounds of data presented by them, it inevitably lands itself in uncertain speculations and insoluble contradictions. Hence revelation is the only pathway to the knowledge of God. This, it has to be decisively noted, is not due to the dubitable character of the Divine but definitely due to the demonstrable limitations of reason. Reason works magnificently when it is instrumental to other *pramāṇas,* clarifying, co-ordinating and justifying their deliverances, but when thrown on its own resources independent of them, it fabricates impossible conjectures. Mystic intuition, *aparokṣa-jñāna,* is no use in the context, because it constitutes the fruition of spiritual endeavour and therefore cannot itself furnish the basis for it. Hence revelation, constituting the Vedāntic scriptures, is our sole guide for knowing the highest metaphysical truth.

Brahman is declared by the *Upaniṣads* as "*advaitam paramārthataḥ*". Madhva interprets this enunciation to mean that it is unsurpassed and not even equalled by any other entity.[32] It is absolutely supreme, totally incomparable.

This uniqueness of super-eminence is due to the qualitative magnificence of Brahman, appropriately identified with Viṣṇu. There is no question of the God-head being literally quality-less except in the legitimate sense of being antogonistic to the so-called *guṇas* of *prakṛti* and the imperfections of the *jīva* engendered by the same *guṇas*. In fact, the supreme Being is described as infinite (*ananta*) precisely on account of its immensity of glorious and real *guṇas*, excellences.[33] "*Mayyanantaguṇe anantaguṇataḥ anantavigrahe*"; "*mahadguṇatvāt yamanta ma huhu*"; "*bhagavān anantaḥ ananta guṇārṇavaḥ.*"

At this stage, we have to discuss the important category of *viśeṣa*, which discussion we have postponed so far. While we speak of the attributes of God, we are treading on difficult grounds. The exact determination of relations between the substantive being of God and His attributes is called for. There are four wrong views on this question according to Dvaita. There is the view that Brahman has no attributes. There is the second view that it has attributes and, that the attributes are entirely different from the *svarūpa* or substantive essence. There is the third view that the relation between the two is one of identity–cum–difference. According to the fourth view, there are two types of attributes, inner and outer, the first set is identical with the *svarūpa* and the other set is external *to it* and *different* from it.[34] In Dvaita all these four views are refuted. Its own position is that there are *attributes, that they are identical with the substantive nature* (*svarūpa*) *and still admit of conceptual and verbal distinction* by virtue of the principle of *viśeṣa*. *Veśeṣa* is therefore that category which explains the possibility of distinction between a

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32. *VTV*, p. 257.

33. *Bhāgavatam*, I *Skānda*, 18–19; also 5–25–6, *Tattvodyota* of Madhva.

34. Jaya Tirtha on *VTV*, pp. 354–355.

substance and its attributes in discourse without importing into the integral unity of the entity the difference between the substance and attributes and also that among the attributes themselves.

Appayya Dīkṣita argues that this principle could have been extended to cover the relation between Brahman and *jīva* also and that the dualism between the two could have been abandoned. But the principle of *viśeṣa* cannot be used to combine what are inherently opposed in nature, as Brahman, with its perfections and the *jīva* with its undeniable limitations are.[35]

Now, this principle is explanatory of not merely Brahman and its attributes, but also all cases of substances with inalienable attributes. It is a universal and pervasive metaphysical principle. Many of the apparently non-dualistic passages in the *Upaniṣads* just mean this non-dualism within the unbroken unity of Brahman. It is used to illumine the relation of the primordial Brahman to its incarnations and diverse forms and also that between It and Its external form or *ākāra* glorified in Vaiṣṇavism.

The attributes are truly infinite. Even the highest of the high among *jīvas* can 'apprehend' them and cannot 'comprehend' them. It is this inexhaustibility of attributes that is often meant in the *Upaniṣads* when they say that Brahman is beyond thought and words. But some classification of attributes is possible. There are the metaphysical attributes such as infinite power, infinite knowledge and infinity itself in relation to time and space. There are attributes constituting the compassionate and gracious aspect of the Lord. Creation itself is traced to this aspect.[36] These are also real and ultimate. It is in this aspect that love comes in. Madhva closes many of his works by referring to the relation of love that he enjoys with his God.[37] There is considerable uniformity in this. This is not a humanization of the Almighty, but a discernment of the ultimate source of that rare quality of love in the most divine of human beings although in an infinitesimal

35. *Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana.*

36. For instance *VTV*, *Iśāvāsya-bhāṣya.*

37. *Kāṭhaka-bhāṣya*, '*Kṛpaluta*'.

degree.[38] No wonder Madhva adores the love-aspect of God. He was a devotee of the great *Bhāgavatam*, which is a saga of transcendent love. The love of God to his devotees is such, says Madhva, in his *Gītā-bhāṣya*[39] that He sets aside his self-dependence and majesty, as it were, and subordinates Himself to His true devotee. One should not be carried away by the dialectic of Madhva, —though it is great—and lose sight of his passionate attachment to his God of love and grace.

God, for Madhva, is infinite beauty also. His form, if we may so speak, is unspeakably blissful. It is no material adjunct. It is spiritual through and through.[40] In it is concentrated absolute beauty. Madhva dwells on it with abandon, as it were, in his great hymn, *Dvādaśastotra.* Herein we have intensely rapturous absorption in the intoxicating beauty of God, reminiscent again of the great *Bhāgavatam.*

While this is roughly the major type of attributes adorning Viṣṇu, Madhva is emphatic that an exhaustive cognition is impossible for the finite intellect. But, for purposes of meditation it is necessary to capture the most defining attributes. Hence Madhva lists four aspects of God that ought to go into every real meditation on Him. They are *sat-cit-ānanda-ātmatva*. Brahman must be understood as absolute reality, absolute consciousness, absolute bliss and as the absolute self of all.[41] These constitute the essential minimum, without including which in the scope o meditation, one cannot be said to be practising meditation on the supreme Being. Beyond this minimum, finite selves can go to the extent their natural capacity and the level of spiritual advancement permit. The range their vision can command constitutes their status in the hierarchy of finite spirits.

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38. There is a conventional estimate of Greek religion that the Greek Gods, 'were human, all too human". Hegel retorted that the right criticism would be that they "were not human enough".

39. *Gitā-bhāṣya,* IX, 29.

40. *Sūtra-bhāṣya,* 2–2–41.

41. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya,* 3–3–12.

So far we have been considering the *guṇotkarṣa* or qualitative magnificence of God. It is this that makes Him transcend matter, the finite spirits in both their states of bondage and liberation, and even Lakṣmī who is designated *Akṣara*. But He is not merely transcendent. He is not the actionless *puruṣa* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, nor the *niṣprapañca*–Brahman, the acosmic absolute of Advaita. He is immanent in the cosmos of matter and finite selves, through His cosmic activity. Why this activity for the divine Spirit? Is it not wholly self-fulfilled having nothing to attain and no external purpose to materialize? There is a unique answer and so far we can see no other Vedāntin seems to have arrived at this conception. Madhva repeats it in many of his major works. It forms part of his interpretation of the Seventh Chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*[42], introducing Brahman as the *Bhūman*. Not all activity is actuated by the desire to get rid of an evil or to attain what is yet unattained. On the analogy of artistic creativity, we ought to recognize that even fulness of fulfilment and consequent ecstasy can issue in irresistible activity. This is activity not *for* attainments, but *activity from* attainment, perfection overflowing into dynamism. The implication of this idea is far-reaching. It presents an absolute Being that is creatively dynamic through the *elan vital* of its own abundance. It further means that the power for action on the part of finite selves, which exert themselves to overcome their imperfections, is limited in proportion to their antecedent imperfections. An imperfect being can be creative only imperfectly. The perfect spirit, being what it is, can be boundlessly dynamic and creative.

Now this cosmic activity of God is eightfold. Its first form is *sṛṣṭi* or creation of the world. Creation does not mean bringing anything into being out of absolute non-being. What exists previously is brought into a new configuration, and in the case of the world it means bringing it into explicitness in terms of manifold names and forms. Madhva is careful to insist that creation is not of the nature of self-transformation of Brahman. He is equally emphatic that the material cause which it trans-

42. *Anuvyākhyāna*, 1-1-14.

forms into the effect is not an autonomous substance existing in its own right in its causal state. By God's appropriation of it in the causal process He is not depending upon anything which is not His and which is not what it is through His power. His being all in all creation is not compromised.

The second form of God's cosmic activity is the maintenance of the world so created. He is not the God of Deism releasing the world into existence, to be independent of Him ever afterwards. It is His world after creation also, and He sustains it in actuality. His hold on it is co-terminus with its continuance. If that were to be withdrawn, it would shrink into nothingness. The third activity of God is the withdrawal of the world into its condition of non-manifestation and mere potentiality, waiting for His causal touch to spring into manifestation. The fourth aspect of God's cosmic function is regulation. This is not to be construed as manipulation from a distance, but inward control. All that the term *antaryāmin* standardised by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* signifies is incorporated herein. Tne fifth activity relates to the living and conscious *jivas* in creation. It consists in covering them with *avidyā*. *Avidyā* is a positive force, not mere absence of knowledge. It has two aspects. It conceals his own nature from *jiva's* understanding and conceals the nature of the supreme Being also. This infliction of ignorance is not to be understood as an arbitrary act of God, but as brought by Him in answer to the *jiva's* antecedent deformities of deed and thought. It is in the nature of a just carrying out of the consequences of the *jiva's* own *karma.* The sixth activity of God is the gift of enlightenment. Enlightenment is not something that happens independent of divine grace. Grace is to be worked for through spiritual aspiration and effort. Enlightenment is in two levels. It may be mediate and intellectual understanding of the nature of the *jiva* and the Lord through the devout study of scriptures. There is the higher level of enlightenment by way of the intuitive vision of reality. Both these are gifts of grace in answer to the aspirant's ardent and sustained endeavour towards that end. This two-fold grace is the sixth cosmic function of God. The seventh is called bondage. Bondage means the soul's imprisonment in matter and the suppres-

sion of its own essential blissful nature and the non-attainment of God by way of experience. This is brought about by God in consequence of the antecedent spiritual failure of the *jiva* in question. The wrath of God always descends by invitation, as it were. God is equal, no doubt, but his equality to creatures is a responsive equality. It would have been sheer inequality if He rewarded with equal bounty the creatures with unequal worth.[43] There is an unfailing adjustment of grace to its invocation by the individual through his life. The last cosmic activity of God is the gift of liberation to those who are worthy of it. Liberation is a gift, and the gift should be deserved through appropriate ardour of devotion founded on exact knowledge of the glory of the Supreme. The consummation crowns the life of the most advanced devotee, *parama-bhakta*, by the final grace, *parama-prasāda*. Liberation frees the devotee from his captivity in matter, releases his suppressed potentialities of the nature of knowing and rejoicing and renders the blissful reality of God a perpetual presence to his wakeful consciousness.

Madhva realized the impossibility of doing full justice to the majesty of God. Hence, in a profound passage he sums up the cardinal points of what he calls "*samyag-vinirṇaya*",[44] unerring and conclusive judgement. They are four:

(1) Viṣṇu abounds in all excellences.

(2) He is free from all blemishes.

(3) Everything depends upon Him, while He is absolutely self-dependent.

(4) He is different from all else; otherwise, His freedom from blemishes cannot be true.

With this Madhva would want us to conclude our synopsis of his philosophy of God.

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43. *Gītā-tātparya*, IX, 29.

44. *Anuvyākhyāna*, 3, 3, verses 78–79.

V. MOKṢA AND THE SĀDHANA THEREFOR

A

In our study of the metaphysical aspects of Dvaita, we have had hints and anticipations of what the school upholds as the supreme value or ideal to be pursued and realized by the finite self. Now we have to gather the full notion of the ideal called *puruṣārtha*. It is not necessary to point out that, like all the other non-materialist schools of thought and even early Buddhism which has an element of naturalism, this system advocates the renunciation of the lower ends such as *kāma* and *artha* and even *dharma* in its old utilitarian or ritualistic sense as paltry and transitory, and conceives of *mokṣa* or liberation as the ultimate perfection of life to be attained. This is what constitutes the final goal.

Further characterization of this end is necessary. All schools are agreed that *mokṣa* must signify emancipation from all the afflictions of life. It is needless to go into the ancient but exact classification of three afflictions. There is divergence of view as to what could constitute this emancipation. Early Buddhism seems to have held that the illusion of a solid and unbroken personality must be annihilated for afflicitions to cease. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in its early phase seems to have held that cessation of embodiment would bring about this cessation of pain and suffering and in the process the self so freed from embodiment would lose its consciousness also. Anyway there would be the ending of affliction. In Advaita Vedānta the ideal implies the dissipation of the individuality of the self and its recovery or recognition of its non-dualism with the universal and absolute Self. All these three views are common in so far as they recognize the necessity for loss of the empirical personality either wholly or its conscious existence or its uniqueness and individuality. Dvaita discountenances these views and characterizes them as nihilistic in various degrees. It upholds the *continuance of conscious individuality* as necessary for the attainment of all worthwhile goals and particularly for the supreme self-consummation that *mokṣa* is. In Sāṅkhya, this continuance is provided for, but it seems to rest in the negative

connotation of *mokṣa* as merely the cessation of the 'three fires' of life and does not envisage the positive aspect of liberation as joy. This seems to be the stage at which Dvaita actively enters into the formulation of the ideal. *According to it, mokṣa must be the fulfilment of conscious individuality in the attainment of the positive experience of eternal joy.*

So much seems to have been admitted in Jainism and in some later treatises of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But that is not the end of the problem. The inclusion of the positive content in the emancipated life arouses a fresh line of inquiry. How is this element of joy to be brought in? Release from the body and all that it implies can bring about freedom from affliction. But what of the additional feature of joy? The *Upaniṣads* had declared that there is no joy in the finite, that the supreme Self or Brahman is of the nature of *ānanda*, and all earthly joys are just tiny drops from this infinite fountain of delight. All the other schools of Vedānta also contend that joy, infinite and eternal, is to be found only in Brahman. Therefore to make possible this positive aspect of *mokṣa* the finite self must integrate itself with Brahman, the sole repositary of bliss. In a way this integration is there as an eternal metaphysical fact, but the finite self must attune itself in its consciousness and life to Brahman. What is required is an integration in consciousness. The integration, for Dvaita, cannot mean the merger of the individual self into the universal self shedding its specific personality. It can only mean its absorption in the experience of Brahman with a full recognition of its utter dependence on that soul of souls. It is union without self-extinction, by way of experience, conformity in will and a life of blissful sub-ordination. Utter surrender to the Supreme is the highest exaltation and the summit of triumphant joy. It is an unfoldment of the inherent nature of the individual in the commanding presence of God and that constitutes the *ānanda* of the summum bonum. The main points of *mokṣa* may be stated in brief. It is (a) a total and final cessation of afflictions, (b) an emancipation from the blending and binding imprisonment in matter brought about by *karma*, (c) an unfoldment of what constitutes the essence of the individual self, a *self-finding* rather

than a self-annihilation, (d) an unfoldment in and through the joyful presence and vision of God and (e) a rapturous exercise of the rightful role of dependence and subservience to Him. So much, perhaps, is common to all theistic and *bhakti* schools of Vadānta.

There is another feature affirmed in Dvaita in conformity to its doctrine of the inherent hierarchy of souls. The souls have various grades of natural capacity. Accordingly their fulfilment of the means of *mokṣa* are bound to be of varied levels. Hence the end attained by them by way of comprehension and joy are bound to be of corresponding grades and levels. There is a natural continuity and consistency between intrinsic competence and spiritual endeavour on the one hand, and between that endeavour and attainment on the other. There is no violation at any stage of the hierarchic system. The evils of inequality in the earthly life of materialistic values are not be suspected in the Kingdom of God, where the pure spirits rejoice in the guidance and benediction from their spiritual superiors and bestow them bountifully on their inferiors.[45] There is a divine harmony in and through this very inequality. This is the doctrine of *ānanda-tāratamya*, and to critise it from the earthly abhorrence of inquality is to make a 'transcendental use' of 'an empirical category'. The basis for the doctrine, according to Madhva, is there in the scriptures, even as there is a similar basis in them for the connected doctrine of the natural hierarchy of souls and for that concerning the existence of souls pre-destined for perpetual *saṁsāra* and the final damnation of spiritual darkness.[46]

B

With this outline of the idea of *mokṣa* we have to proceed to a consideration of the means, or *sādhana*, as propounded in Dvaita for the realization of this supreme end.

Sādhana is naturally a progressive endeavour, and it mobilizes all the resources of personality. It is a fascinating task to draw

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45. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, III, iii, 34.

46. Madhva on the Fourth Chapter of the *Brahma-sūtra* for the entire doctrine of *mokṣa*.

a full picture of it through the very clear statements of Madhva on the theme. He assimilates remarkably into his scheme the entire heritage of the *Upaniṣadic* thought, the *bhakti* literature such as the *Purāṇas*, the *Āgamas*, and the *Epics* and the core classic, the *Bhagavadgītā*.

(1) The foremost and the ultimate factor that brings about man's liberation is the grace or *prasāda* of Nārāyaṇa. Madhva is never tired of, rather delights in, repeating the dictum "without Nārāyaṇa's *prasāda*, *mokṣa* is not possible".[47] There are many levels of grace that confers this supreme boon. "The grace that responds to *karma* is the lowest, that which is in answer to disciplines such as *śravaṇa* is of the middle level, and that which rewards the precious possession of knowledge is the highest".[48]

It is to be noted that this *prasāda* is an ever-existent reality and all that is required is human effort to actuate it towards the granting of *mokṣa*.[49] It is ultimately God Himself through His grace, which is indistinguishable from His essence through the principle of *viśeṣa* that effectuates the summum bonum of man, moved towards that end, by the spiritual endeavour of the aspirant. The works of grace in this realm are manifold. The *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya* lays down that "Viṣṇu grants knowledge to the ignorant, grants liberation to the man of knowledge and grants *ānanda* to the liberated individual."[50] Grace is a continuously operative factor in spiritual life from the beginning and does not cease to be required and efficacious even when the goal is an accomplished fact.

(2) The final point of human effort that brings down grace to this operational manifestation is *bhakti*. The standard definition of *bhakti* in the Dvaita tradition runs as follows: "*Māhātmya-jñāna pursvastu sudrdhaḥ sarvatodhikaḥ*; *sneho bhaktriti proktaḥ*

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47. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I, i, 1.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Nyāyasudhā*, I, i, 1.
50. *VTV*, p. 129.

tayā muktiḥ nacanyathā ".[51] There are two constituents of *bhakti*, knowledge of the greatness of God and love towards Him. It must fulfil the condition of steadfastness and must be surpassing in its intensity superseding all other love, including self-love. It is that height of *bhakti* that could invoke the grace effective for the purpose of *mokṣa.* There are obviously different levels of *bhakti* and the *Gītā* itself mentions four levels. Only the highest *bhakti* is required in the present context.

Madhva is one of the greatest philosophers of *bhakti*. His anthology of devotional verses from the ancients in his *Kṛṣṇāmṛta-mahārṇava* testifies to his profound sensitiveness. The role he assigns to *bhakti* is omnipresent as it were, in spiritual life. The *Anuvyākhyāna* has this passage (3–4): "*Bhaktyā jñānam, tato bhaktiḥ, tato dṛṣṭiḥ tatasca sa tato muktiḥ, tato bhaktiḥ, saiva syāt sukha rūpini*".

'*Bhakti* generates knowledge, knowledge, in its turn, generates *bhakti*, which, in its turn generates the direct perception of God. This perception generates *bhakti*, which brings about *mukti* or liberation. In the state of liberation *bhakti* abides as the joy of liberation.' It seems to be the first means and the constituent of the last end itself. Jaya Tīrtha names the level of *bhakti* that brings about the final liberating grace of God *parama-bhakti*.

(3) This *bhakti*, we have already seen, must spring from knowledge. It is no mere emotion. In fact Madhva goes to the extent of characterizing it as a particular form of knowledge itself "*Jñānasya viśeṣa*".[52] Its character and qualitative level depend upon the knowledge on which it is founded. The highest *bhakti* can spring from only the highest level of knowledge. Therefore the *bhakti* of this context must issue from the immediate, direct and perceptual or intuitive apprehension of God. This is called *aparokṣa-jñāna*. It is only this knowledge for which the majesty of God in its magnitude and clarity could be evident and in

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51. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*. III, iii, 58.
    See *Mahābhārata-tātparyanirṇaya*, I, 86.
52. *Anuvyākhyāna*, III, iv, 5–199.

perfect certitude. This cannot be mere meditative imagination carried to the point of perceptual vividness. Madhva insists that it must exceed that imaginative immediacy.[53] Only the love engendered by the direct communion with the object of love can have the appropriate height and intensity. Hence *aparokṣa-jñāna* is a necessity.

(4) How to achieve this perceptual experience of God? The means prescribed for that is *upāsanā* or *nididhyāsana*. This is meditative contemplation of God with love and longing for the vision. It paves the way for the direct experience, through the invariable means of grace. Madhva insists that the meditation should not be heartless or mixed with fear or animosity. It must be of the nature of ardent seeking. The indirect intellectual understanding of God gathered from revelation and philosophical investigation can be converted into direct experience only through loving meditation. *Aparokṣa-jñāna* is the crowning phase in the process of knowing God, and it starts with indirect knowledge. To effect the transition from mediacy to immediecy, *upāsanā* is the essential means.

Trivikrama Pandit has a fine sentence in the context. He says: "*Nirantara-cintanamantareṇa, ananta-darśanapratibandhakasya santatasya karmaṇaḥ anupamardanīyatvatvāt*". "The acumumlated *karma* which prevents the emergence of the vision of *Ananta* cannot be eliminated except through uninterrupted contemplation."

There are, of course, many levels of *upāsanā* also. The unenlightened fix their thoughts on God in the sacred images. The ritualists worship Him in the sacred fire. The Yogins meditate upon Him as dwelling in their own hearts. Some others regard Him as residing only in external nature. But the wise ones meditate upon Him as immanent in all.[55] In meditation of the right type it is necessary to dwell on God as *sat-cit-ānanda-ātmā*, this being the basic defining characterization of God-head.

53. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, III, ii, 36.

54. *Brahma-sūtra*, III, i, 1.

55. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I, i, 31.

(5) Meditation is a determined process. For it to be possible, the aspirant must be free from doubts and uncertainties. He must be convinced and in absolute certainty about what he meditates upon. For this, philosophical investigation carried to the point of conclusive establishment of the truths about God is necessary. In its absence, doubts will assail the meditating devotee, and his sceptical devotion will carry him nowhere. Certainty of conviction is a prerequisite to steady and determined meditation, which only can deliver the goods. Hence *Brahma-jijñāsā*, as embodied in the *Brahma-sūtra*, is necessary for founding meditation upon. This is the *manana*, mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*.

(6) But *jijñāsā* or philosophical inquiry must be on the data of a *pramāṇa* and in the present case revelation is the only *pramāṇa*. Therefore as a presupposition of *manana* or *jijñāsā*, *śravaṇa* or the study of the right scriptures is necessary. The student, say Madhva and Jaya Tirtha, must be steadfast, devout, and earnest about comprehension. The scriptures reveal their inner import only to such an approach.[56] Madhva has a fine pronouncement on the purpose and duration of these three steps of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.

" Śruṇuyādyāvadajñānam,
Matiryāvadayuktatā,
Dyānañca yāvadikṣā syāt"

" One must study the scriptures as long as there is ignorance, must reason as along as there is *prima facie* unreasonableness in the contents of the scriptures, and must meditate until direct realization takes place.[57]

The fundamental elements of *sādhana* have been brought out in the concepts of *aparokṣa-jñāna* and *parama-bhakti*, the two being the proximate means to the action of supreme *prasāda*. The doctrine of the *bhakti* tradition championing *bhakti* as the saving factor and that of the *Upaniṣads* holding forth that *jñāna*

56. *VTV*, p. 5.

57. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, IV, i, 12.

is the pathway to salvation are duly harmonized and the supreme factor of grace is duly assigned its ultimate role.

There is one element of life that is yet to find a place in the scheme of *sādhana.* That is the ethical aspect, usually named *karma.* It plays a subordinate role.

(7) *Karma-yoga* as presented in the *Gītā* is an indispensable part of the complete scheme of *sādhana.* *Karma* as ordinarily understood in ritualistic parlance and performed for obtaining earthly or heavenly rewards stands discarded. It has to be a *yoga,* disinterested and performed in the spirit of worship. It includes all actions as rightly explained in the *Gītā.* *Karma-yoga* has a two-fold efficacy. In the first place, it produces the appropriate purity of spirit necessary for the emergence of *jñāna.* Secondly, if performed, after the emergence of *jñāna,* it adds to the ānanda that follows from *jñāna.* Madhva lays down the two principles.

"*Sarva-dharmāpekṣā ca jñānasya-utpattau*
"*Subbha-karmabhirādhikyam.*"[58]

The tradition does not advocate the total renunciation of action, as if action itself and not merely the motive behind it, is the binding force. While elucidating the last verse of Śrī Krişņa's teaching to Arjuna, exhorting him to 'renounce all *dharma's,* Madhva takes care to interpret this renunciation as the *sāttvic* renunciation preached in the Eighteenth Chapter itself, meaning simply the renunciation of the self-centred motivation in action,[59] Madhva subscribes to the grand pronouncement of the *Bhāgavatam* that, that is legitimate *karma* which is done in worship of Hari.[60] "*Tatkarma haritoṣam yat*".[61] There could be no sense in abandoning such acts done in adoration of God. Even in such action, the external aspect of act is subordinate and has instrumental value in relation to the resulting vision, which is the final

58. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya,* III, iv, 25–26.
59. *Gītā-bhāṣya,* XVIII, 66.
60. *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya,* I, ii, 21.
61. *Bhāgavatam,* IV, 29, 19.

element in *sādhana* and thus that knowledge only is the means to liberation stands uncompromised. All this is in the high tradition of Vedānta assimilating into itself the essential *karma-yoga* of the *Gītā*.

(8) If all this is the ethics of action, there is such a thing as an ethics of selfculture in relation to the development of a spiritual temper or disposition. In this connection the *Upaniṣads* and *Gītā* are rich in their prescription. The Dvaita tradition fully incorporates this ethics of disposition. Jaya-Tīrtha in his commentary on *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya* explaining Madhva's term *sajjana* in the second verse brings out this inner ethics of personality. He lists four attitudes as making up this ethics. The first of them is a discernment or *viveka* of what is abiding and transitory among the values open to man's pursuit. The outcome of this discernment must be the next attitude of detachment towards the perishable trivialities of life. This is *vairāgya*. Supplementing this negative attitude, which is but the rejection of the unworthy, there must be positive inclination, rather passionate desire, for the highest value of life, namely, *mokṣa*. This is called *mumukṣutva*. It is necessary to keep both the negative and positive dispositions in view, so that we may not fall into an extremely ascetic or extremely hedonistic interpretation of spiritual life. It is conquest over the lower and a quest for the higher. It is both an escape *from* and an *escape to*. It is both self-negation, in so far as the self seeks the finite goods of earthly life, and self-affirmation in so far as the self seeks life eternal and life abundant. The fourth dispositional equipment to be cultivated consists of certain qualities five of which are listed in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.[62] They are *śama*, *dama*, *uparati*, *titikṣā* and *samādhāna*. Madhva interprets them as 'steadfastness in devotion to the Lord, 'subjugation of pride', 'dwelling with satisfaction on the Lord within one's own heart', 'equanimity in pleasure and pain', and 'contemplativeness". There is a *bhakti*-oriented interpretation of *śama* and *uparati*, as could be easily noticed. The whole of this equipment is named *śamādisampat*. These four attitudes, *viveka*, *vairāgya*, *mumukṣutva*

62. IV, iv, 24.

and *śamādisampat*, constitute the basic dispositional preparation for the higher life of *śādhana*.

(9) These, then, are the elements and stages that constitute the pathway of *sādhana*. To enumerate them in the ascending order: the fourfold equipment, *sādhana-catuṣṭaya*; *karma-yoga*, the pathway of action; *śravaṇa*, the study of revelation; *manana*, the philosophical investigation into the revelation producing conviction; *nididhyāsana* or *upāsanā*, devout meditation; *aparokṣa-jñāna*, direct apprehension of the Supreme; *parama-bhakti*, supreme love; and *parama-prasāda*, the supreme grace. It should be distinctly noted that *bhakti* and *prasāda* are operative throughout in various levels. It should also be noted that *jñāna* is a matter of several levels interspersed between *prasāda* and *bhakti*. The final word in the progression is *prasāda*. It is Nārāyaṇa's *prasāda* which for Madhva is the ultimate redemptive power. His ecstasy of adoration is directed to that height of heights.

The message of Śrī Madhva stands out in blazing clarity. It is a devoted and thorough-going vindication of the final wisdom of Śrī Veda Vyāsa. What emerges difinitively from the study of all scriptures and all philosophical explorations is the necessity for a perpetual devotion to the Highest. To allow interruption of the devotion is to court calamity and ruination. There is no evil which is not traceable to it.

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(1) *The Unfolding Purpose*: Principal Miller Endowment Lectures, University of Madras.

(2) *Durga-saptasati* or *Exposition of the Glory of the Divine Mother*: Indian Philosophy Congress Lectures delivered at the University of Madras.

(3) *Paramata-sara* of Abhinava Gupta. Kannada Translation and Notes.

(4) *Vedartha Saṅgraha of Ramanuja*: English Translation.

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(6) *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi of Sureśvara*: Introduction, English Translation and Notes.

(7) *Introduction to Vedartha Saṅgraha.*

(8) *Ramanuja on the Gita.*

(9) *Rāmānuja on the Upaniṣads.*